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INTRODUCTION

Sarah Snodie is a very violent person and she should receive the
maximum prison sentence for her crimes.
1
Robert Jambois, Kenosha County District Attorney
[T]he level of coercion and control Sarah endured in that
relationship I do think is analogous to being in the concentration
camp and very much like that where time, money, where you go,
what you say, what you do, isolating you from other people, all
those things existed, aside from the face of very tense, prolonged
and recurrent and severe physical and sexual violence.
2
Dr. Kevin Fullin
Eighteen-year-old Sarah Snodie watched her boyfriend,
Donnell McKennie, torture and kill her seventeen-month-old son,
Drake London. Sarah Snodie explained to the police that
3
McKennie struck Drake so many times she lost count. McKennie
4
also assaulted Sarah twice on the same day. An autopsy revealed
5
Donnell
that Drake London died of massive brain injuries.
McKennie received a forty-five-year sentence after being convicted
of first-degree reckless homicide, and Sarah Snodie received a ten6
year sentence for felony child neglect.
Sarah Snodie became a multifarious symbol of perpetrator and
victim. Was she a cold-blooded woman capable of watching her
live-in boyfriend kill her child? Or was she a hapless victim of abuse
who could not intervene to save herself or her child from the abuse
of Donnell McKennie? The criminal justice system treated her as
the former, and Sarah Snodie received a devastating prison
sentence. Not only did she witness her child being killed by her
7
abuser, the State charged Sarah for failing to save her child’s life.

1. Transcript of Sentencing at 5-6, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 21, 1997).
2. Id. at 29-30.
3. Criminal Complaint at 4, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1997).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Judgment of Conviction, Snodie, No. 97CF0046; Judgment of Conviction,
McKennie, No. 97CF0047.
7. David Cole, Defense Lawyer Wants Gag Order on Abuse Case, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 28, 1997, at 3. The charges and final disposition are as follows:
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A battered mother who unsuccessfully attempts to protect
herself and her children against an abuser does not fit within any
8
model that would garner sympathy from any court or jury. When
the abuser kills the woman’s child, the law treats her as an
9
accomplice to the murder.
The criminal justice system fails to understand the trauma that
a woman like Sarah Snodie suffered within the relationship with
10
the abuser. An examination of the relationship between Snodie

Count WIS. STAT. §

Charge

Crime Final Disposition

1

948.03(4)

Failure to Act to Prevent Felony Dismissed/Pr
Bodily Harm
C
Motion

2

948.03(4)(a)

Child Abuse-Fail/
Great Harm

3

948.21(1)

Neglecting a Child (Cause Felony
Guilty/No Contest
Death)
C

4

948.03(2)(b)

ChildAbuse-Intentionally
Cause Harm

Prevent Felony Dismissed/Pr
C
Motion

Felony Dismissed/Pr
D
Motion

Id.
8. See Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of
Parental Rights, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1995) (“Mothers who decide that
any aspect of their lives has greater value than, or is co-equal with their concern
for their children, are the bad [mothers].”).
9. See People v. Pollock, 780 N.E.2d 669 (Ill. 2002) (following precedent,
stating that failing to act on the child’s behalf establishes a mother’s
accountability, a mechanism by which a conviction may be secured); see also Kim
Ahearn et al., The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers
with “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2000)
(citing reasons why battered mothers fail to seek assistance before a case such as
Sarah Snodie’s takes place). The article states:
We are also concerned that battered mothers will be less likely to seek
domestic violence intervention if there is an increased risk that they will
suffer arrest and the loss of their children to foster care. The Instant
Response Protocol could lead to these outcomes if there is not clear
guidance about the role of law enforcement and child protective workers
in these cases and adequate training of child welfare workers about how
to work with law enforcement. The current protocol does not define any
criteria for when [the child protective agency] should refer a case to the
police or when the police should refer a case to [the child protective
agency]. Without a clear standard for when arrest or removal of children
is appropriate, both police and child protective workers may err on the
side of removing children rather than the batterer.
Id. at 856-57. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group cites the reasons why
battered mothers fail to seek assistance before a case such as Sarah Snodie’s takes
place. Id. at 857-62.
10. See Diane R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically
Abusive Relationships, 5 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 107, 113 (1990) (determining that 99% of
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and McKennie under a psychological rubric would have given the
court a greater understanding of the trauma Snodie suffered and
the strategies she used in negotiating survival with a violent
11
partner.
The psychological state of the woman must be
12
examined.
If the law perceives that a woman failed to protect her child,
13
she faces severe civil and criminal penalties. Courts terminate the
14
parental rights of battered mothers in civil failure to protect cases.
Battered mothers are also prosecuted to the fullest extent of the
15
law.
Many women have not only been charged with failure to
16
render aid, but are also charged as accomplices to the murder. It
battered women surveyed experienced some psychological abuse and 72%
experienced at least four types of psychological abuse).
11. See Susan V. McLeer et al., Education Is Not Enough: A System’s Failure in
Protecting Battered Women, 18 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 651 (1989) (concluding that
training and establishment of screening protocol of females admitted in a
hospital’s emergency department identified increased numbers of battered
women for whom essential care and services could be provided).
12. See Follingstad et al., supra note 10, at 116-17.
13. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part VI.C. (discussing cases where battered mothers had their
parental rights terminated).
15. One of the first cases to prosecute a mother for the death of her child by
an abuser was Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960). The court succinctly stated
the reasons for appellate review:
The theory of the state’s case is that the appellant was guilty of gross, or
criminal, negligence in permitting her paramour to inflict, upon her
twenty months’ old child, prolonged and brutal beatings that finally
resulted in the child’s death; and that her said negligence, under the
circumstances here presented, was a proximate cause of the child’s
death. The defense argues that the appellant’s conduct did not measure
up to gross, or criminal, negligence; and her negligence, if any, was not a
proximate cause of the death.
Id. at 468. The court held:
In 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson), Section 68, the
learned author states: “[i]t is sufficient that the ultimate harm is one
which a reasonable man would foresee as being reasonably related to the
acts of the defendant . . . . To constitute the cause of the harm, it is not
necessary that the defendant’s act be the sole reason for the realization of
the harm which has been sustained by the victim. The defendant does
not cease to be responsible for his otherwise criminal conduct because
there were other conditions which contributed to the same result.” The
appellant easily could, and should, have removed Terry from this danger.
Her failure to do so, under the circumstances previously described, is
sufficient, as indicated before, to support a finding by the trial judge that
her gross and criminal negligence was a contributing cause of Terry’s
unfortunate death.
Id. at 474.
16. Cf. Corey Kilgannon, For a Notorious Victim, Some Things Never Heal, N.Y.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/8

4

Brown: When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An Affirmative Defense
6BROWN_PAGINATED.DOC

11/17/2005 9:54:01 AM

2005] WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS

193

is difficult to craft a defense that gives an adequate response to the
troubling question of why a woman would allow a man to physically
17
abuse, or worse, kill her child. The psychological phenomenon of
traumatic bonding addresses this perplexing question.
When a battered woman acts against the violence perpetrated
against her by killing her abuser, affirmative defenses may vindicate
18
her violent behavior. A battered woman may give testimony and
have witnesses explain the length and depth of the abuse she
19
endured.
She is also allowed expert testimony to explain the
mental anguish and trauma she suffered at the hands of her
20
abuser. The battered mother whose child is killed by her abuser
faces termination of her parental rights and criminal charges. She
needs an affirmative defense and a legal standard that examines
21
the nature of her violent relationship and her subjective beliefs.
TIMES
Feb.
10,
2004,
at
B2,
available
at
www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/nyregion/10profile.html
(detailing
the
upcoming release of Joel Steinberg from prison after serving his sentence for the
murder of the child he raised with his former mate Hedda Nussbaum whom
Steinberg abused as well). The charges against Nussbaum for the death were
eventually dropped after statements by doctors that “years of his beatings had left
her paralyzed by pain and terror, and too weak to intervene.” Id.
17. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for
Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579 (1998)
(arguing for change in failure to protect laws, specifically requesting that courts
take into account that some mothers are not able to provide requisite protection
for fear of their own death or serious injury); see also G. Kristian Miccio, A
Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing and Recreating the Battered
Woman in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89 (1999) (suggesting
that states may be accomplices to domestic violence due to nonfeasance).
18. See Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far
Enough: The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 141, 151-52 (1995)
(suggesting that battered women should be allowed to be seen as vigilantes who
are acting out against the violence perpetrated against them). Vigilante should
have a neutral connotation as in persons who are allowed to keep order and
punish crime. Id.
19. See Book Note, Generalizing Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1384 (1990)
(reviewing Lenore E. Walker, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND
HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989), which discusses a call to reform by a woman that
has provided expert testimony in more than 150 cases on the effect of repeated
abuse to a battered woman claiming self-defense).
20. Id. at 1384; see, e.g., State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001) (recognizing and applying battered women’s syndrome in MO. REV. STAT. §
563.033 (1999) which defines the scope of admissible evidence on the issue); State
v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (Wash. 1984) (joining courts that allow testimony on
battered women syndrome). But cf. People v. White, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill.
1980) (finding expert testimony on the general question of whether “battered
women tend to remain with their mates” irrelevant).
21. See Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let’s Stop Punishing Victims
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The purpose of this article is twofold: (1) to establish a
subjective legal standard in failure to protect cases that addresses
strategies battered mothers use to protect their children and their
subjective belief of what protection and intervention means, and
(2) to allow women like Sarah Snodie the opportunity to explain
their perceived inaction and be able to defend or mitigate criminal
charges of omission with a duress defense.
Parallels can be drawn between self-defense with battered
woman syndrome as the psychological foundation and the use of
duress as an affirmative defense with traumatic bonding as the
22
psychological foundation.
Many courts give women who react
23
violently against their abusers leeway to explain their trauma.
Women who suffer the same trauma but who use unconventional
strategies to protect themselves and their children should be
24
allowed to assert their defense before the court as well.
and Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 268 (1987) (noting that the
abused, when emotionally, economically, and physically dependent on the abuser,
may not recognize the serious nature of domestic abuse).
22. See Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Its Impact on Jurors’ Decisions in
Homicide Trials Involving Battered Women, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 225, 227
(2003) (discussing how battered woman syndrome evidence should be presented
to emphasize the woman’s social reality and context of her life, not just her
psychological state). But cf. Mira Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered
Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253
(1987) (arguing all battered woman syndrome evidence should be kept out of
court).
23. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Self Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral
and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 477, 507 (1996) (detailing reasons why courts admit expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome). But cf. Andrea L. Earhart, Note, Should a Defendant Be
Denied the Affirmative Defense of Self Defense if the Criminal Act Was Not Intentional? Self
Defense or Defense for Self? Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 1999), 1 WYO. L REV.
695 (2001) (observing that the Wyoming Supreme Court did not allow expert
testimony of battered woman syndrome as it is not considered an affirmative
defense but used only to establish the defendant’s state of mind during the
homicide).
24. See Amy R. Melner, Rights of Abused Mothers vs. Best Interest of Abused
Children: Courts’ Termination of Battered Women’s Parental Rights due to Failure to Protect
Their Children from Abuse, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 299, 325-28 (1998)
(arguing for a rationality approach for courts to consider when assessing
affirmative acts mothers used to protect their children from abuse); see also Mary
E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems,
Custody Outcomes and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13
(1995) (highlighting the lack of social support for mothers who escape abuse with
their children makes the choice to leave a difficult one); Clark, supra note 21, at
293 (emphasizing that the burdens and consequences should fall on the
perpetrator of the crime, not the abused victim); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic
Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the
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Battered mothers need an affirmative defense that opposes
societal presumptions that they made no attempts to protect their
children from violence. Traumatic paralysis can be used as the
25
foundation of duress to bolster the abused woman’s assertions.
Traumatic paralysis is the merging of the psychological phenomena
26
of traumatic bonding with the duress defense. It is likened to a
27
self-defense model with the use of battered woman syndrome.
Expert testimony would be garnered to support the duress claim
and explain the perceived lack of activity on the part of the abused
28
mother to protect her child from the abuser.
An affirmative
defense of traumatic paralysis should only be available under
narrowly prescribed circumstances. For example, mothers who are
culpable in the deaths of their children without a history of an
abusive relationship should not be given the opportunity to use
29
traumatic paralysis. Other affirmative defenses can be used for
30
such cases.
Courts are far less accepting of women who cannot save their
31
children from abuse. Failure to protect laws seem fashioned to
Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1993) (warning that reforms may be insufficient in light
of gender discrimination in the litigation process); V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting
Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229 (1996) (detailing the deficiencies of failure to protect laws
as currently written); Jacobs, supra note 17, at 655 (encouraging continued efforts
to understand the effects of violence on women and evaluate whether the threat of
violence legitimately fits in the duress defense); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images
of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 94 (1991)
(concluding that recognizing oppression will facilitate addressing dangers faced
and enhance capacity for change in the legal system); Linda J. Panko, Legal
Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect Their Children from Their
Male Partner’s Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 67 (1995) (reviewing statutory
developments emerging to address statutory deficiencies); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 111 (1993) (noting that while courts
generally treat female criminals more leniently than male criminals, courts treat
criminal mothers the harshest for violating their traditional maternal role); Karen
D. McDonald, Note, Michigan’s Efforts to Hold Women Criminally and Civilly Liable for
Failure to Protect: Implications for Battered Women, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 289, 307-09
(1998) (suggesting that the Michigan Legislature adopt an affirmative defense
statute for both the criminal neglect and child abuse statutes).
25. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 215-17
(1986).
26. Id. at 216.
27. Id. at 215.
28. Id. at 216.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race,
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32

prosecute mothers, not fathers.
Overcoming the societal
expectation that the mother is the ultimate defender of her child
presents a daunting task. Constructing a legal standard for a
mother who fails to save her child’s life becomes nearly impossible.
Many courts apply an objective or strict liability standard in failure
33
to protect cases. No explanation of abuse the mother endured
34
would counter her failure to intervene under such legal standards.
A subjective legal standard would allow the court to view the
duration and intensity of the abusive relationship through the eyes
35
of a reasonable battered woman.
and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584-85 & nn.40-41 (1997)
(citing Bernadine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the
Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 5 (1995) (discussing bias in the legal
and child protection systems) and Becker, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that
mothers are prosecuted in greater numbers than fathers for failure to protect
their abused children and are held to higher standards)).
32. See Panko, supra note 24, at 68.
Failure-to-protect laws have a disparate impact on women because men
are more frequently active abusers and women often cannot protect
themselves or their children from a male partner’s abuse . . . [because of]
(1) fear of retaliation by the abuser; (2) economic dependence on the
male abuser; (3) emotional dependence on the male abuser . . . and (4)
family or legal pressures . . . .
Id.
33. See discussion infra Part VI.C. (reviewing the objective and strict liability
standards and accompanying cases); cf. Suzanne D’Amico, Comment, Inherently
Female Cases of Child Abuse and Child Neglect: A Gender Neutral Analysis, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 855, 875 (2001) (arguing for an approach that seeks to redress the
female over-representation in child abuse and neglect cases stating “[t]he biased
application of failure to protect statutes perpetuate the myth that child abuse
cases, even when the perpetrator is male, are ultimately the fault of the female.”).
34. D’Amico, supra note 33, at 874-75.
35. See discussion infra Part VI.C; see also Deborrah Ann Klis, Reforms to
Criminal Defense Instructions: New Patterned Jury Instructions Which Account for the
Experience of the Battered Woman Who Kills Her Battering Mate, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 131, 143-44 (1994) (arguing for a lower degree of culpability for battered
woman who killed their mates and argues for a “reasonable battered woman
standard”). Klis discusses a jury instruction added to the California Evidence
Code, under section 1107, to instruct juries on the importance of expert testimony
in battered woman syndrome defenses. Id. at 147-48. Section 1107 defines the
admissibility of expert evidence regarding battered women’s syndrome:
(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the
prosecution or the defense regarding [battered women’s syndrome],
including the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or mental abuse
on the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence,
except when offered against a criminal defendant to prove the
occurrence of the act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the
criminal charge.
(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert
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This analysis of traumatic paralysis as an affirmative defense
36
A fundamental review of Dr. Lenore
unfolds in five sections.
Walker’s studies explores the foundational structure of battered
37
woman syndrome. Battered woman syndrome is next displayed as
the psychological foundation of self-defense claims for women who
38
kill their abusers.
Next, the analogy is made that traumatic
bonding and the psychological effects of women bound to their
39
abusers are equivalent to battered woman syndrome. The analogy
is then theorized to craft the affirmative defense in civil and
40
criminal cases with the foundation of traumatic paralysis.
In
conclusion, an examination is conducted of the failure to protect
laws, and a new legal standard is theorized that would address the
conundrum of prosecuting battered women for their partners’
41
abuse.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTERED WOMEN
Dr. Walker’s seminal study in the late 1970s sought to explain
42
why women stay in abusive relationships. She interviewed more
43
44
than 120 women and found consistent themes in their stories.
The women interviewed were a mixed group that represented all
ages (seventeen to seventy-six years of age), races, religions,
45
educational levels, cultures, and socioeconomic groups.
The
testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and
the proper qualifications of the expert witness. Expert opinion testimony
on battered women’s syndrome shall not be considered a new scientific
technique whose reliability is unproven.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107(a)-(b) (West 1995).
36. See discussion infra Part II.
37. See discussion infra Part III.
38. See discussion infra Part IV.
39. See discussion infra Part V.
40. See discussion infra Part VI.
41. See discussion infra Part VII.
42. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xvii (1979).
43. Id. at xiii.
44. Id. at 31.
45. Id. Uniform application of battered woman syndrome is rejected by many
scholars based on race and class standards Dr. Walker articulated. See Sharon
Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 194-95 (1991) (arguing battered woman syndrome is a
white woman’s syndrome and the intersectionality of race and gender should
include women of color who may not meet the weak and scared typology that
Walker’s theory promulgates); Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and
Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 344 (1995)
(arguing commonly held stereotypes have contributed to negative outcomes in
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relationships spanned from the short term of two months to the
46
long term of fifty-three years. Walker detailed nine similarities
amongst battered women—the women (1) have low self-esteem,
(2) believe common myths of battering relationships, (3) believe in
the traditional feminine sex-role stereotype, (4) accept
responsibility for their batterers’ actions, (5) suffer from guilt and
deny feelings of terror and anger, (6) present passive public faces
but can manipulate the home environment to stave off violence or
death, (7) suffer from severe stress reactions, (8) use sex to
47
establish intimacy, and (9) seek no outside assistance. In seeking
to explicate the lives of the women Walker interviewed, she
amassed two theories: learned helplessness and the cycle of
48
violence.
In The Battered Woman, Walker applies the experiments of
49
Martin Seligman to explain learned helplessness.
Seligman
placed dogs in cages and administered electrical shocks at random
50
The dogs quickly learned that no matter
and varied intervals.
what response they attempted, they could not control the shocks.
Initially, the dogs sought escape through various movements that
51
did not lessen the shocks. Eventually, the dogs ceased further
52
voluntary activity and became “compliant, passive and submissive.”
Even when the researchers gave the dogs an escape route, the dogs
battered women’s cases in many respects).
For instance, the notion that battered women are weak, passive, or
pathological for “staying” with the abuser fuels society’s disbelief and
distrust of the women’s claims, and resistance to providing protection or
criminal prosecution of the abuser. Inaccurate images of abusers as “out
of control” monsters often cause judges and other officials to refuse to
believe that the polite, calm, and “normal” man in front of them could
be guilty of the horrible acts of which he is accused. These same
stereotypes can cause students to have difficulty advocating for, or
effectively counseling, their clients; the representation may be negatively
affected if students perceive the client as dysfunctional or sick. This gap
often arises if the client still cares for the abuser, who the students may
assume is purely monstrous, and never charming or loving. Moving
students (and lawyers) beyond these stereotypes is therefore critical to
their effectiveness as advocates.
Id. at 344 (citations omitted).
46. WALKER, supra note 42, at 31.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 45-51, 55-70.
49. Id. at 46.
50. Id.; see also M.E.P Seligman et al., The Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in
Dogs, 73 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256 (1968).
51. WALKER, supra note 42, at 46.
52. Id.
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53

would not respond. Seligman’s theory was further refined and
reformulated, based on later laboratory trials with human
54
subjects.
Walker extends Seligman’s research to explain why
battered women lose their powers of discrimination and self55
preservation.
Walker summarizes the debilitating effect of learned
helplessness on human problem solving skills.
Repeated batterings, like electrical shocks, diminish the
woman’s motivation to respond. She becomes passive.
Secondly, her cognitive ability to perceive success is
changed. She does not believe her response will result in
56
a favorable outcome, whether or not it might . . . . The
learning ability is hampered and the repertoire of
responses from which people can choose is narrowed. In
57
this way, battered women become blind to their options.
The cyclical nature of the violence compounds the battered
58
woman’s experience of learned helplessness.
Walker attempts to answer the perplexing question of why
53. Id.
54. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 86 (1984).
55. Contra MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN ET AL., LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 238-39
(1993). The authors disagree with Walker’s use of learned helplessness to explain
the perceived passivity of battered women, finding a different answer as to why
women remain with their husbands who beat them. Id. The authors find:
Contrary to what one might expect, the frequency and severity of beating
is not related strongly to whether a wife leaves an abusive husband.
Theorists have thus searched for other reasons. There is support for two
factors that make sense: psychological commitment to the marriage and
economic dependency.
Id. at 238 (citations omitted). The authors further note that Walker is incorrect in
the methodology she uses in explaining the passivity of battered women:
“[Walker] argues that traditional socialization imparts to women a belief in their
own helplessness. Further, she finds that a large proportion of abused wives were
abused as children, which satisfie[d] . . . the requirement that uncontrolled events
precedes helpless behavior.” Id. at 239. However, the authors bluntly state
learned helplessness is “misunderstood by this theorist.” Id. The authors note that
the passivity observed among victims of domestic violence is a “middling example”
of learned helplessness:
Passivity is present, but it may well be instrumental. Cognitions of
helplessness are present, as is a history of uncontrollability. But there
may also be a history of explicit reinforcement for passivity.
Taken
together, the results do not constitute the best possible support for
concluding that [abused women] show learned helplessness.
Id.
56. WALKER, supra note 42, at 49-50.
57. Id. at 48.
58. Id. at 49.
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women stay in violent relationships with her Cycle Theory of
59
Violence. Walker’s tension reduction theory details three distinct
phases found in a recurring battering cycle: (1) tension building,
60
(2) the acute battering incident, and (3) loving contrition.
Battered women endure the first two phases to experience the love
61
and contrition of the last phase. The unfortunate reality for these
relationships is that battered women risk their lives waiting for the
62
approach of the last phase.
Walker acknowledges that battering incidents take place
during the first phase but the gravity of the violence of the acute
63
battering incident distinguishes the first and second phases. The
64
second phase is uncontrollable, destructive, and brief. This phase
causes the most severe physical violence and psychological stress to
battered women due to not knowing when the acute violent
65
incident will occur.
Women involved in long-term battering
relationships may provoke the acute battering incident to cease
66
living with the anticipation of violence. The batterer attempts to
discipline the woman after her behavior infuriates him enough to
67
justify his violent behavior.
Walker finds that the violence the
batterer uses to impose authority is so brutal that the batterer
68
exceeds his original intent and severely beats the woman. Thus,

59. Walker explains that the third phase of the cycle theory of violence
involves the batterer convincing his victim that the abuse was a one-time incident
that will never happen again. Id. at 65. Contra Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing
and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on
Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 220 (1986) (finding the underlying theme
throughout the expert testimony cases is the dilemma that victimization poses for
feminist legal theory: “Examination of the expert testimony cases on battering has
suggested that a perspective like battered woman syndrome, which either
emphasizes victimization or which is susceptible to being characterized as
victimization, raises serious problems for women in theory and practice.”).
60. WALKER, supra note 54, at 95.
61. See WALKER, supra note 42, at 69 (explaining that the rewards of the
relationship for the battered woman come during this phase, even though she may
not realize that “she has traded her psychological and physical safety for this
temporary dream state”).
62. See id. at 62 (explaining the loss of control common in phase two: “The
violence has an element of overkill to it, and the man cannot stop even if the
woman is severely injured.”).
63. Id. at 59.
64. Id. at 59-60.
65. Id. at 59-61.
66. Id at 60.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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69

the batterer becomes guilt-ridden and contrite.
The batterer then adopts the persona of a charming,
affectionate, apologetic mate who promises the battered woman
70
that he will never engage in such violent behavior again. Walker
explains that the battering partner has supposedly learned never to
act in such a fashion again and believes he has taught the battered
woman not to engage in behavior that would trigger another
71
The battered woman in this phase is
violent encounter.
particularly vulnerable to persuasions to remain with the batterer
72
made by friends or family members engaged on his behalf.
Walker notes that immediately after a violent encounter, the
73
woman is convinced of her desire to cease being a victim.
However, once the women resumed contact with their violent
74
mates, the relationship continued. The women face pressure not
to destroy the family, even if the batterer is to blame for the rift in
75
the relationship. Battered women convince themselves they will

69. Id. at 65.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 65-66. Cf. Jane Maslow Cohen, Self Defense and Relations of
Domination: Moral and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Regimes of Private
Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
757, 762-63 (1996) (describing relationships that fit the mold of private tyrannies
as dissimilar to battering relationships).
Although battering may well play a role in their maintenance, it is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of their existence. In fact,
private tyrannies may be organized and maintained on a variety of
different terms. These terms may evolve, at the discretion of the person
denominated the tyrant, in response to an endogenous shift in
preferences, an exogenous change in circumstances, or both. The
condition that is necessary to the maintenance of a regime of private
tyranny is that the life of at least one person who lives or formerly lived in
the same household with the tyrant be subject to his domination and
control in respect to such objectively important elements of everyday life
that a reasonable member of society would not ordinarily consent to live
under the same terms and conditions and would not view the consent of
any other person to live under such circumstances as a rational exercise
of choice. As a matter of rational reconstruction, then, the structure of
private tyranny and its relationship to the concept of consent is
analogous to the much-referenced but little demonstrated example of
voluntary slavery. It is not a subject to which the idea of consent lends
any justificatory distinction.
Id.
72. WALKER, supra note 42, at 66-69.
73. Id. at 66.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 66-67.
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76

no longer suffer abuse. The batterers adopt behavior that the
women idealize, thus prolonging the relationship and endangering
77
the lives of the woman and her children.
The criminal justice community has not universally accepted
battered woman syndrome as a means to defend women who are
78
charged with murdering their abusers. Several cases reveal that
courts are hesitant to accept the rubric of battered woman
syndrome under the guise of self-defense without an imminent
79
threat to a woman’s life. The legal community questions whether
such conclusions can be drawn about the existence of battered
80
woman syndrome.
Dr. Lenore Walker’s studies and analyses have been attacked as
being statistically inconclusive at best, and at worst as labeling
76. Id. at 67.
77. Id. at 66; see also Christine Nicole Becker, Clemency for Killers? Pardoning
Battered Women Who Strike Back, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 305 (1995) (citing Nancy
Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 43). Patricia Kastle, an Olympic
skier, was shot by her former husband even though she had a restraining order
against him. Id. Shirley Lowery’s former boyfriend stabbed her nineteen times
with a butcher knife in the corridor of the courtroom where she went to get a
restraining order. Id. Finally, Lisa Bianco was beat to death with the butt of a
shotgun by her husband when he was out of jail on an eight-hour pass. Id.
78. Cf. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self Defense, and Duress: Making Sense,
Not Syndromes, out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211 (2002). Burke argues
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) does not withstand empirical scrutiny and the
basis of Dr. Lenore Walker’s research is flawed. Id. at 235-40. Burke also argues
that BWS would not be admissible as expert testimony under the standards of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), for expert testimony.
Id. at 232-40.
79. See John W. Roberts, Between the Heat of Passion and Cold Blood: Battered
Woman’s Syndrome as an Excuse for Self-Defense in Non-Confrontational Homicides, 27
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135 (2003); see also Pugh v. State, 382 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989) (overruling a state motion to exclude defendant’s evidence of battered
woman’s syndrome); Rogers v. State, 616 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(defendant sought to introduce battered woman syndrome evidence but was
excluded from doing so by the trial court but the Florida Court of Appeals
overturned the conviction). Several cases follow the same appellate history. See,
e.g., Bonner v. State, 740 So.2d 439 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); Freeman v. State, 496
S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1998); State v. Smith, 486 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. 1997); Commonwealth
v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990); State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474 (Nev. 2000); People v. Torres, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); Bechtel v.
State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash.
1984).
80. See Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the “Battered Woman’s Defense”:
Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567 (1992); Mary Ann Dutton,
Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993).
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battered women with a psychological disorder when the abuser is
81
the actual culprit. The use of battered woman syndrome as a self82
defense claim has also garnered controversy. Many courts fail to
distinguish the use of self-defense under the traditional model of
immediate threat of death or great bodily harm versus the use of
battered woman syndrome to explain the pervasive and threatening
83
environment in which battered women live.
Despite the
controversy, federal and state courts allow battered woman
84
syndrome and expert testimony about its effects. A review of the
use of battered woman syndrome in self-defense cases will divulge
the reasons for the conflicting positions of the courts.
III. SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN
Defenses to criminal charges fall into two categories:
85
justifications and excuses. A justification defense contends that,
although the State may be able to prove the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt, the defendant was justified in her actions and
86
should not be held criminally responsible.
An excuse defense
allows the defendant to commit a criminal act under the mistaken

81. See ROBBIN S. OGLE & SUSAN JACOBS, SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN
WHO KILL: A NEW FRAMEWORK 53 (2002).
82. Id. (explaining that non-confrontational cases where the abuser is killed
are the most troubling for the court to allow defense counsel to use self-defense
claims and allow expert testimony on battered woman syndrome); see also Anne M.
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994) (critiquing the feminist view of
the battered woman syndrome defense); David L. Faigman, The Battered Women
Syndrome and Self Defense: A Legal & Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986)
(addressing the relationship of the battered woman syndrome and the self-defense
doctrine). Both authors argue against the accepted notions of battered woman
syndrome. Id. Coughlin finds that men are not allowed defenses that explain the
pressures exerted by their spouses in similar situations. Id. Faigman strongly
argues against the general acceptance of battered woman syndrome considering it
is not scientifically sound research. Id.
83. See discussion supra Part II (describing cases and discussing the
acceptance of battered woman syndrome in trial courts).
84. Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in
Criminal Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 85 (1996) (stating that sixteen federal
courts and twelve state statutes allow battered woman syndrome expert testimony).
85. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 (University of Chicago Press 1979)
(1769). Blackstone recognized justifiable homicides as those in which the slayer is
not in the minutest degree at fault and excusable homicides as those in which
there is some fault, some error or omission so trivial, that the law excuses it from
the guilt of felony. Id.
86. OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 81, at 101.
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belief that such force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily
87
harm. The defendant will be held criminally responsible, but to
88
lesser charges.
LaFave and Scott recognize self-defense as a justification
89
defense. However, many legal scholars reject the notion that self90
defense should be used as a justification defense. Peter Heberling
notes that a justification defense is one that excuses conduct that is
otherwise criminal and allows such conduct to be socially
91
acceptable.
One critic finds no substantiation for the use of
justification or excuse in self-defense cases:
The tension between justification and excuse exists just as
a tension exists between an objective and subjective
“reasonable person” standard. To allow a killer to
subjectively individualize the reasonable man standard is
to excuse the conduct of the killer because of her lack of a
culpable mental state. If killing in self-defense is truly a
justifiable action under criminal law theory, are we saying
that anyone afflicted with battered woman syndrome may
kill her abusive partner at any time, with or without
immediate or imminent provocation because of the
92
constant fear of attack?
Courts have recognized that killing is justifiable under specific
circumstances that predate the battered woman syndrome, such as
a threat of great bodily harm or death in non-intimate
93
relationships.
94
Self-defense also includes the concept of mutual combat.
87. Id.; see also State v. Torres, 393 S.E.2d 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
88. OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 81, at 101.
89. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 454-56 (2d ed.
1986).
90. Peter D.W. Heberling, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on
Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 916 (1975); Roberts, supra note 79.
91. Heberling, supra note 90, at 916.
92. Roberts, supra note 79, at 155.
93. OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 81, at 119.
94. Donaldson v. State, 289 S.E.2d 242, 244 (Ga. 1982) (“Mutual combat . . .
generally involves deadly weapons and the mutual intention of using them.”)
(citing Powell v. State, 239 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)). A mutual combat
situation arises when “both parties are at fault and are willing to fight because of a
sudden quarrel.” McClendon v. State, 199 S.E.2d 904, 905 (Ga. 1973). The
mutual intention to fight need not be proved directly, but may be inferred by the
jury from the conduct of the parties. Id.; see also, Ison v. State, 118 S.E. 721 (Ga.
1923); Bailey v. State, 96 S.E. 862 (Ga. 1918); Spradlin v. State, 286 S.E.2d 310 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1981); Peacock v. State, 267 S.E.2d 807 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Knight v.
State, 37 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946).
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Mutual combat allows the defendant to use as much force as
95
Courts
necessary to thwart the violence of the perpetrator.
recognize that defendants have the right to use deadly force to
quell a violent attack that would otherwise lead to the defendant’s
96
imminent death. The introduction of battered woman syndrome
to bolster self-defense claims by battered women does not fit the
97
classic paradigm of self-defense. The defense calls for courts to
instruct juries not on an objective belief that the defendant’s life
was in danger, but on a subjective belief that based on what the
defendant knew at the time of the homicide, the defendant’s
98
actions were justifiable or excusable.
95. Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse, Husband Abuse or Mutual Combat? A
Feminist Perspective on the Empirical Findings, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE
90, 107 (Kersti Yllö & Michele Bograd eds., 1988). Saunders notes many victims
do not draw the distinction between mutual combat and self-defense. Id.
96. See Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 424 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1790); see also, Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546 (1896) (asserting right
of self-defense valid when one seeks to take another’s life); Alberty v. United
States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896) (arguing that a person who fears for his life may use
the force necessary to repel the assault); Lane v. State, 222 A.2d 263 (Del. 1966)
(asserting a person may use no more force than is necessary to ward off a
threatened injury); State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1961) (noting that use of
deadly force to prevent a violent attack leading to imminent death is appropriate);
State v. Ronnie, 125 A.2d 163 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1956) (noting that one may
intervene for the defense of a third person using means that he would use to
protect himself from a similar confrontation); State v. Centalonza, 86 A.2d 780
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (asserting one can justify his attempt to take the
life of another only if his own life was threatened and the danger could not
otherwise be avoided); State v. Goldberg, 79 A.2d 702, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1951) (arguing that one may meet the force of his assailant if the force is
necessary); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 124 A.2d 407 (Pa. Super Ct. 1956) (noting
one who feels life is in jeopardy may defend himself whether the danger is real or
apparent); Mewes v. State, 517 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 1973) (noting the validity of a plea
of self-defense rests on the excuse of an otherwise unlawful homicide, battery, or
assault). Cf. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); Beard v. United States,
158 U.S. 550 (1895); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (Ohio 1876).
97. See supra Parts II, III. The Model Penal Code recognizes three categories
of self-defense for battered women: confrontational, non-confrontational, and
third party. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04-.05 (1985).
98. See Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1992); People v. Aris,
264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2000);
State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Gaines, 36 P.3d 438
(N.M. 2001); In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992); State v. Purdy,
491 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1992); State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832 (N.D. 1992);
State v. Ronne, 458 N.W.2d 294 (N.D. 1990); State v. Frey, 441 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.
1989); State v. Thiel, 411 N.W.2d 66 (N.D. 1987); State v. White, 390 N.W.2d 43
(N.D. 1986); State v. Lang, 378 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1985); State v. Kolobakken, 347
N.W.2d 569 (N.D. 1984); State v. Fridley, 335 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1983); State v.
Liedholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983), State v. Jacob, 222 N.W.2d 586, 588-89
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Defense attorneys have used Dr. Walker’s theories of learned
helplessness and the cycles of violence to proffer defenses that
explain the psychological trauma of being the victim in a battering
99
relationship. Requesting that jurors take the subjective viewpoint
of the battered woman may answer the question many jurors pose:
100
Why would an abused woman stay in a violent relationship?
Dr.
101
Walker’s theories help articulate what battered women cannot.
Defense attorneys no longer have choices of how to utilize Walker’s
theory of battered woman syndrome—self-defense is the only
102
option.
The insanity defense is no longer a viable defense
(N.D. 1974); State v. Hazlett, 113 N.W. 374 (N.D. 1907); State v. Thomas, 673
N.E.2d 1339 (Ohio 1997); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992);
State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1992); State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59
(Wash. 1977); State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Adams,
641 P.2d 1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Painter, 620 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1980); cf. People v. Robinson, 261 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)
(asserting the jury shall discern whether the defendant actually believed that he or
she was in danger rather than whether a reasonable man under the circumstances
would have believed himself to be in danger).
99. Many legal scholars do not accept Dr. Walker’s analysis of battered
women having a psychological syndrome. See Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered
Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 113 (1994) (advocating for a focus on ordinary factual
evidence and the pattern of battering, rather than battered woman syndrome).
100. Mira Mihaljovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IN. L.J. 1253, 1263 (1987); see also
Richard Gelles, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 659 (1976).
Gelles found where the violence was less frequent and less severe the woman was
more likely to stay in the relationship. Id. at 666. How much abuse the woman
endured as a child gauged also whether the woman would stay in the abusive
relationship. Id. at 667.
101. Defendants charged with murdering their abusers have sought to
introduce the history of abuse only to be denied by the trial and appellate courts.
See Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 950 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Arcoren v.
United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (8th Cir. 1991); Ibn-Tamas v. United States,
407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979); Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The
Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545
(1988) (analyzing the problems battered women encounter in court).
102. Cf. Burke, supra note 78, at 218 (“[T]he defendant who claims selfdefense must be treated (and judged) as a rational actor. Under the rational actor
approach, whether a defendant’s belief is reasonable must be determined in light
of her objective individual circumstances, not from her own psychologicallyindividualized perspective.”).
Burke further argues “the rational battered
woman’s necessary uses of force can be justified by realigning, rather than
expanding, the right to use defensive force.” Id. at 219. “The current standard for
self-defense correlates only imperfectly with necessary uses of force.” Id. “In other
words, the standard sometimes punishes acts that are necessary, and sometimes
exculpates acts that are not.” Id. Accordingly, Burke argues “that changing the
rules of self-defense to encompass more accurately the standard of necessity is
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because it carries a heavier burden because of past political and
103
legal changes.
Creative defense attorneys may utilize self-defense to explain
the battered woman’s violent reaction to her mate. However,
greater hurdles exist depending upon which form of self-defense
an attorney uses. Courts are reticent to accept an affirmative
defense, such as self-defense without proof of imminent or
104
immediate threats of great bodily harm or death.
simply a realignment, and not an expansion, of the right to defensive force.” Id.
“The battered woman syndrome theory, in contrast, has the potential to expand
significantly the application of self-defense by excusing unnecessary killings,
simply because they were committed by sympathetic actors.” Id.
103. The insanity defense is extremely hard to utilize. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: POSITION STATEMENT (1982), available at
http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/198202.pdf; see also
Stuart M. Kirschner & Gary J. Galperin, Psychiatric Defenses in New York: Pleas and
Results, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 194 (2001) (noting the insanity defense is
rarely proffered). That test holds that a person would “not [be] responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra, at 2. The attempted assassination of former
President Ronald Regan by John Hinckley and his being found not guilty by
reason of insanity in 1982 destroyed the use of the insanity defense. Id. at 10-11.
Following the Hinckley case, Congress altered the U.S. federal and military
standards for the insanity defense, limiting it to the so-called “cognitive prong” of
the ALI test—that a defendant would not be responsible if “as a result of severe
mental disease or defect, [he] was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of his acts.” Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 § 403(a), 18
U.S.C. § 4241 (2000). Altogether, three quarters of the states and the federal
government have imposed some form of insanity defense reform since Hinckley’s
1982 acquittal. HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY:
EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 35-39 (1993). The insanity defense is not
often used, and when used is frequently unsuccessful. See Kirschner & Galperin,
supra, at 195. According to a 1991 eight-state study funded by the National
Institute of Mental Health, the insanity defense was used in less than one percent
of the cases in a representative sampling of cases before those states’ county
courts. Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas:
An Eight State Study, 19 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331-38 (1991). The study
showed that only twenty-six percent of those insanity pleas were argued
successfully. Id. at 408. Most studies show that in approximately eighty percent of
the cases where a defendant is acquitted on a “not guilty by reason of insanity”
finding, it is because the prosecution and defense have agreed on the
appropriateness of the plea before trial. See Raymond Lande, The Military Insanity
Defense, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 93, 197 (1991).
104. See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). The North Carolina
Supreme Court overturned a lower court opinion that granted a new trial to the
defendant because she was denied the right to a self-defense instruction. Id. at 9.
The court found that the defendant’s killing her husband in his sleep did not rise
to imminent fear of death or great bodily harm even though she claimed she was a
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The classic model of self-defense falls into categories of perfect
and imperfect. The Model Penal Code explicates the use of a
105
perfect self-defense model in the use of deadly force.
The
defendant must believe that the use of deadly force is immediately
necessary to protect himself or herself against death, serious bodily
106
injury, forcible rape, or kidnapping.
Additionally, the use of
deadly force must be justified by a reasonable belief standard: “the
privilege of self-defense is based on reasonable appearances, rather
than on objective reality . . . . A person is justified in using force to
protect himself if he subjectively believes that such force is
necessary to repel an imminent unlawful attack, even if
107
appearances prove to be false.” Perfect self-defense requires both
subjective honesty on the part of the defendant and objective
reasonableness. The defendant must actually and honestly believe
that deadly force is necessary for her protection, and her belief
108
must be objectively reasonable.
If the subjective and objective
elements are met, then the defendant will be completely
109
exonerated.
110
Common law recognizes the use of imperfect self-defense.
Traditionally, the common law rule was that if any element
necessary to prove self-defense is lacking, the defense is wholly

battered woman. Id.; see also People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 183 (Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming conviction of allegedly battered woman who killed her husband while
he was sleeping); State v. Baldwin, 412 S.E.2d 31, 37 (N.C. 1992) (upholding lower
court’s decision to exclude testimony on defendant’s hearsay statements to
psychologist); State v. Fisher, 563 S.E.2d 100, 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to
overturn conviction based on lower court’s failure to instruct jury on imperfect
self-defense); State v. Jackson, 550 S.E.2d 225, 229-30 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that defendant was not entitled to jury instruction on self defense);
Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88, 90 (S.C. 1992) (holding that defendant’s
attorney was not negligent in failing to present battered woman’s syndrome
defense).
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985) (governing use of force in selfprotection).
106. Id. § 3.04 (2)(b); see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 251
(3d ed. 2001).
107. DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 222.
108. OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 81, at 114.
109. See, e.g., State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984) (overturning the
defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder because of an inadequate jury
instruction on the defendant’s suffering from battered woman syndrome and her
subjective belief based upon the history of violence in the relationship).
110. See, e.g., People v. Gregory, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 791 (Ct. App. 2002),
review granted, 58 P.3d 928 (Cal. 2002), review dismissed and cause remanded (holding
that delusion alone is not enough to support an imperfect self-defense).
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111

unavailable to a defendant.
Some states “recognize a so-called
‘imperfect’ or ‘incomplete’ defense of self-defense to murder,
which results in conviction for the lesser offense of either voluntary
112
or involuntary manslaughter.”
For example, a defendant who
fails to satisfy the “reasonableness” component, although his belief
113
was genuine, might be able to assert an “imperfect”
or
“incomplete” claim of self-defense, mitigating his crime to
114
manslaughter.
The Model Penal Code recognizes three categories of
115
imperfect self-defense for battered women.
Confrontational
homicide occurs when a battered woman kills her partner during a
116
battering incident. In such cases, an instruction on self-defense is
117
Courts now routinely permit a battered woman to
usually given.
introduce evidence of the decedent’s prior abusive treatment of

111. See DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 231.
112. Id. Expert testimony on battering and its effects is most readily accepted
by state courts in cases involving traditional self-defense situations, i.e., it has been
accepted by ninety percent of the states in such circumstances. Parrish, supra note
84, at 84. Expert testimony has also been admitted by a substantial number of
state courts in nontraditional self-defense situations, “such as where a battered
woman kills her batterer while he is sleeping (accepted by twenty-nine percent of
the states) or by hiring a third party to kill him (accepted by twenty percent of the
states).” Id.
113. See CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 5.17 (2005). Section 5.17 states:
A person who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief
in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily
injury, kills unlawfully but does not harbor malice aforethought and is
not guilty of murder. This would be so even though a reasonable person
in the same situation seeing and knowing the same facts would not have
had the same belief. Such an actual but unreasonable belief is not a
defense to the crime of [voluntary] [or] [involuntary] manslaughter.
Id.
114. See e.g. State v. Necaise, 466 So.2d 660 (La. 1990) (affirming the lower
court decision that allowed the trial court to include the necessity to retreat as part
of the defendant’s self-defense instruction to the jury). The jury denied the
defendant did not act in self-defense. Id. at 669.
115. See DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 235-49 (outlining Battered Women’s
Syndrome).
116. Id. (discussing “confrontational” homicides).
117. See e.g., CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTION § 5.13. Section 5.13 states:
Homicide is justifiable and not unlawful when committed by any person
in the defense of [one’s self] if [the person] actually and reasonably
believed that the individual killed intended to commit a forcible and
atrocious crime and that there was imminent danger of that crime being
accomplished. A person may act upon appearances whether the danger
is real or merely apparent.
Id.
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118

her.
Non-confrontational homicide occurs when a “battered
woman kills her abuser while he is asleep, or during a significant
119
lull in the violence.” “Courts are divided on whether self-defense
may be claimed if there is no evidence of threatening conduct by
the abuser at the time of the homicide, although the majority
position is that homicide under such circumstances is
120
unjustified.”
The most difficult of the imperfect self-defense cases is the
third-party killer cases. The battered woman hires or importunes
another to kill her abusive partner and then pleads self-defense to
121
In third-party hired-killer cases, courts
the charge of murder.
122
have collectively refused to permit self-defense instructions.
Thus, self-defense claims can be used effectively to defend
women who kill their abusers. Battered woman syndrome aids even
women who kill in non-confrontational situations. The next
section explores how traumatic bonding can be used in a similar
fashion to explain inaction instead of reaction to violent
relationships. Jurisdictions are mixed on deciding which types of
cases justify a self-defense claim, but women who fail to act or use
strategies that fail to stop the abuse do not have nuanced defenses
like self-defense for their lack of action.

118. Cf. Beth Bjerregaard & Anita Neuberger Blowers, The Appropriateness of the
Frye Test in Determining the Admissibility of the Battered Woman Syndrome in the
Courtroom, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1 (1996) (reviewing inconsistent admissibility
standards set by differing jurisdictions for battered woman syndrome and arguing
that the courts mistakenly focus on the theory of battered woman syndrome and
not the methodology used by Walker). The authors contend that the Frye test is
inappropriate to determine the admissibility of expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome. Id. at 22.
119. See DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 235-49.
120. Id. at 241; see also State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)
(overturning the conviction of the defendant for voluntary manslaughter after she
shot and stabbed her ex-husband, killing him while he slept). The defendant was
not allowed to raise battered woman syndrome as part of her claim of self-defense.
Id. at 1273-74. This decision has been severely criticized. See Schopp et al., supra
note 99, at 52-53.
121. DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 241 (discussing battered woman syndrome
and third party hired killer cases).
122. Id.; see also Monique M. Gousie, From Self-Defense to Coercion: McMaugh v.
State Use of Battered Woman’s Syndrome to Defend Wife's Involvement in Third-Party
Murder, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 453 (1993) (discussing how courts have dealt with jury
instructions).
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IV. THE FOUNDATION OF TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS
A. Traumatic Bonding
Donald Dutton and Susan Painter developed the theory of
traumatic bonding and argued that powerful emotional
attachments develop from two specific features of abusive
relationships: power imbalances and intermittent good
123
The power imbalance makes the maltreated person
treatment.
124
perceive herself as subjugated or dominated by the other.
The
abused woman perceives the first abusive incident to be an
125
anomaly. The abused woman operates to strengthen the affective
attachment to the abuser because she does not believe that the
126
abuse will be repetitive and inescapable.
“Repeated incidents of
greater severity tend to shift the woman’s cognition to the belief
that the violence will recur unless she does something to prevent
127
it.”
However, by the time the woman realizes that the abuse is
128
inescapable; the traumatically produced emotional bond is quite
123. Donald Dutton & Susan Painter, Emotional Attachments in Abusive
Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Theory, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 105, 105
(1993).
124. Id. at 106; see Virginia Goldner et al., Love and Violence Gender Paradoxes in
Volatile Attachments, 29 FAM. PROCESS 343, 364 (1990) (arguing that abusive
relationships exemplify the stereotypical gender arrangement that structure
intimacy between men and woman generally, and the authors propose that
paradoxical gender relationships create unsolvable dilemmas that can explode
into violence); see also Avonne Mason & Virginia Blankenship, Power and Affiliation
Motivation, Stress, and Abuse in Intimate Relationships, 52 J. PERSONALITY SOC.
PSYCHOL. 203, 209 (1987) (showing that abused women are more likely than
abused men to suffer ill effects throughout the rest of their lives).
125. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 106.
126. Id.; see Ruth Ann Belknap, Why Did She Do That? Issues of Moral Conflict in
Battered Women’s Decision Making, 20 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 387 (1999).
The author asks the ultimate question of moral conflict for abused women: “Must
a woman believe her life to be at stake in order for her to make choices that
protect self and to feel that such a choice is morally correct?” Id. at 402; see also
Vicki A. Moss et al., The Experience of Terminating an Abusive Relationship from an
Anglo and African American Perspective: A Qualitative Descriptive Study, 18 ISSUES IN
MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 433 (1997) (addressing the question of “why don’t they
leave?”).
127. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 106.
128. See Ileana Arias & Karen T. Pape, Psychological Abuse: Implications for
Adjustment and Commitment to Leave Violent Partners, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 55
(1999). The authors stress the importance of assessing for psychological abuse
which is a significant predictor of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Id. at
62. Psychological abuse was found to be a greater precursor for PTSD than
physical abuse. Id. An abused woman who suffered from PTSD was less likely to
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129

strong.
The wellspring of the emotional bond is the power
130
imbalance in the relationship.
Dutton and Painter base their theory on social psychologists’
research in the dynamics of unequal power relationships. Such
research has demonstrated that, over time, the imbalance of these
131
relationships can generate individual pathology.
The 1978
prisoner study reported anxiety and depression in volunteer
subjects after only four days of playing the role of “prisoners” who
132
were relegated to powerlessness in a simulated prison situation.
A leadership study reported “increased redirected aggression in
powerless members of autocratic groups” and researchers reported
“Jewish prisoners’ compulsive copying of the behavior and
expressed attitudes of the Nazi prison guards,” identifying with
133
“Where a person of high power (dominator) is
their aggressor.
intermittently punitive, subjugated persons might adopt the
dominator’s assumed perspective of themselves, and internalize or
134
redirect aggression towards others similar to themselves.”
As the power imbalance magnifies, the oppressed person has a
more negative self-appraisal, is less capable of fending for herself,
135
and is, thus, increasingly more in need of the dominator. “The
cycle of relationship-produced dependency and lowered selfleave an abusive relationship. Id. at 61-62. Women who were able to conceive of
termination of the abusive relationship as a viable option were not hampered by
psychological distress. Id. at 65.
129. Diane R. Follingstad et al., Justifiability, Sympathy Level, and
Internal/External Locus of the Reasons Battered Women Remain in Abusive Relationships,
16 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 621, 624 (2001). Follingstad measured observers’
perceptions of reasons why battered women remain in abusive relationships. Id.
Reasons for staying engender sympathy or understanding if the reasons are within
the woman’s control. Id. The observer is less likely to blame the victim if her
reasons are aligned with the observer’s own value system. Id.
130. See Diane H. Coleman & Murray A. Straus, Marital Power, Conflict and
Violence in a Nationally Representative Sample of American Couples, 1 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 141, 148 (1986). Coleman and Straus’ research found that maledominated relationships measured the most violence and the lowest level of
consensus concerning the legitimacy of the power structure and the highest level
of conflict over family responsibilities. Id at 148-49.
131. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 106.
132. See Philip G. Zimbardo et al., A Pirandellian Prison: The Mind is a Formidable
Jailer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 8, 1973, at 39.
133. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Dee L.R. Graham et al., A Scale for Identifying “Stockholm
Syndrome” Reactions in Young Dating Women: Factor Structure, Reliability and Validity,
10 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3 (1995) (explaining how those in “hostage” relationships
adapt).
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esteem is repeated, eventually creating a strong affective bond from
136
the low to high power person.” Concomitantly, the person in the
high power position develops an inflated sense of his own power
(just as the lower person develops an exaggerated sense of her
powerlessness), which masks his dependency on the low person to
137
transform his feeling of impotence into omnipotence.
136. Dutton & Painter supra note 123, at 107; see also Cohen, supra note 71, at
763. Cohen describes tyrannous romantic relationships as the
fully-matured version of the social, psychological, legal, and economic
morass that the conditions of a tyrannical regime give onto are seldom, if
ever, present at the inception of the relationship. Nor are the conditions
themselves. (That is the experiential reason that it makes no sense to
conceptualize these relationships as relationships of consent: the terms
and conditions of the regime are not presented in an a priori manner, at
the beginning or later, so that consent to them can be either granted or
withheld). Instead, these relationships tend to begin in the ways that
ordinary, non-pathological relationships do—by means of the completely
conventional, strongly traditional, independently unobjectionable
elements of seduction we commonly accept as mating rituals. Through
the lens of later developments, some tendencies of these mating rituals
appear unwholesomely exaggerated in relationships that devolve into
tyrannies. These tendencies also appear, once again, in hindsight, in
relationships involving battering. Perhaps the most prominent of these
are strong, even extreme reactions of jealousy—not mere jealousy toward
present rivals for the affections of the intended partner, but powerfully
negative, deeply critical reactions toward a congeries of persons who may
include the subjects of now-terminated romances; intimate, even close
family members—notably, the children of pre-existent relationships,
though later, the children of the tyrannical relationship itself usually get
folded in; trusted colleagues who function as social intimates within
employment situations; and some or even all friends. As the relationship
deepens, a staunch trade-off may come, with increasing persistence, to be
insisted upon by the potential tyrant: In exchange for the suffusing
warmth, passion, attentiveness, and unusual level of interest to which the
suitor is working to accustom his intended mate, she will be required to
loosen, perhaps even to sever her affective and supportive relationships
with some number of others, perhaps with all of the others she was close
to before . . . . One such reason might fall under the rubric of the
“lonely orphan” phenomenon. Men who seem willing to give over
extraordinary interest and attention to the object of their romantic
desires sometimes arrive with stories in hand of the care and love that
they themselves have never before received. That is the cause, ostensible
or real, of their powerful neediness, their demand for exclusive
attachment. To fall under the spell of these stories is to be empowered
to be a love goddess and the redemptively good mother, at one and the
same time. That may be a difficult form of empowerment to resist,
particularly when it comes wrapped in that which most of us want and
some of us crave—offers of commitment bathed in oceans of love.
Id. at 764-65.
137. ERICH FROMM, THE ANATOMY OF HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS 323 (1992); see
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The omnipotence, however, is predicated on his ability to
138
When the
maintain absolute control in the dyadic relationship.
symbiotic roles that maintain the relationship are disturbed, the
dominator’s masked dependency on the subjugated person is
139
revealed.
In romantic relationships, as well as in cults, power
imbalances magnify so that each person’s sense of power or
140
powerlessness feeds on itself.
In the process, both persons
become welded together to maintain the psychological subsystem
that fulfills the needs created, in part, by the power dynamic
141
itself.
In battering relationships, physical abuse can serve to
maintain the power differential and, when coupled with emotional
abuse including threats against the woman and her children and a
generalized feeling of powerlessness felt by the victim, can serve to
142
maintain the relationship homeostasis.
also Richard J. Gelles, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay?, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 659
(1976) (finding that feelings of powerlessness make a woman more likely to stay
with her abuser).
138. FROMM, supra note 137, at 325. Fromm describes the passion to have
absolute and unrestricted control over a living being as sadism. Id. at 322. Fromm
describes the sadistic character traits as never being understood in isolation from
the whole character structure. Sadism is part of a syndrome that has to be
understood as a whole. Id. at 325. For the sadistic character everything living is to
be controlled; living beings become things. Id. Their responses are forced by the
one who controls them. The sadist wants to become the master of life, and the
quality of life should be maintained in his victim. Id.
139. See id. at 236.
140. See id.; see also Julia C. Babcock et al., Power and Violence: The Relationship
Between Communication Patterns and Power Discrepancies, and Domestic Violence, 61 J.
CONSULTING CLINICAL & PSYCHOL. 40 (1993) (concluding that husbands with less
power were more physically abusive toward their wives).
141. FROMM, supra note 137, at 326. Fromm finds the sadist is only stimulated
by those who are helpless, never by those who are strong. Id. at 325; see also
Eleanor A. Saunders & Jill A. Edelson, Attachment Style, Traumatic Bonding and
Developing Rational Capacities in a Long Term Trauma Group for Women, 49 INT’L J.
GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 465 (1999) (describing the personality attributes of women
in group therapy who are survivors of physical and sexual abuse). The authors
describe the women as “constructing successful social personae.” Id. at 474.
However, the women are also described as experiencing “strong feelings of
defectiveness, helplessness, and self-loathing as well as intense fears about either
damaging or being attacked by others if they were to risk expressing their true
feelings or needs.” Id.
142. See FROMM, supra note 137, at 325; see also Cohen, supra note 71, at 773.
Cohen uses more extreme analysis of the tyrant in the relationship:
A tyrant’s extreme need for control is often linked to outbursts of rage
and to violence. That is what brings partner-battering into the picture in
tyrannical regimes. When violence takes the form of repetitive battering,
it appears to be the product of compulsion. Not infrequently, the
compulsion may itself be triggered by a severely heightened response to
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In Dutton and Painter’s theory, traumatic bonding is also
143
That is, “the dominator
characterized by intermittent abuse.
intermittently and periodically maltreats the dominated by threats,
144
verbal and/or physical abuse.” The end of the abusive episode is
marked by the onset of positive behaviors, which Walker
145
characterizes as the contrition phase of the abuse cycle.
The
victim experiences periods of abusive treatment as well as periods
of positive treatment associated with the end of the abusive
146
incident.
The alternating periods of abusive episodes and
147
positive treatment represent a paradigm within learning theory.
The intermittent episodes of abuse and relief are highly effective in
producing persistent patterns of behavior that are difficult to
148
extinguish and develop strong emotional bonds.
The nuances of the intense emotional bond that an abused
woman has for her batterer can be further explained by attachment
theory.
John Bowlby explained attachment theory as both
149
protective and instructive.
He proposed that maintaining
affectional bonds was essential to the survival of the human species,
some small element of life that presents itself as outside the tyrant’s
control. The crying of a baby seems to operate as such a trigger. A
spouse or partner who breaks a “rule” of the household—by coming
home late, for example, or making a noise that disturbs the tyrant’s
sleep—may well be accused of provoking the ensuing attack. But, some
attacks are more patterned still. Beatings may occur daily, sometimes at
the same time of day. The trigger for these actions seems purely internal
and not a response to an external stimulus at all.
Id. (citation omitted).
143. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107.
144. Id.
145. Id.; WALKER, supra note 42, at 65.
146. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107.
147. Id. Dutton labels the intermittent phases of alternative abusive behavior
followed by positive treatment as intermittent reinforcement and punishment. Id.
148. D.W. Rajecki, Successful Comparative Psychology: Four Case Histories, in
COMPARING BEHAVIOR: STUDYING MAN STUDYING ANIMALS 67 (D. W. Rajecki ed.
1983). Rajecki reviewed emotional bonding in infants and assessed the major
theories of infantile attachment, including those on both human and animal
attachment. Id. at 69. One criterion for the comparative evaluation of his theories
was their relative ability to explain “maltreatment effects.” Id. at 76. In reviewing
the literature on maltreatment effects, Rajecki found conclusive evidence for
enhanced infant animal attachment under conditions of intermittent
maltreatment in birds, dogs, and monkeys. Id. at 76-77. Attempts to inhibit
infants’ bonding to abusive attachment objects were found to inevitably fail unless:
(1) they were persistent and consistently abusive, and (2) an alternate attachment
object existed. Id.
149. Paul R. Peluso et al., A Comparison of Attachment Theory and Individual
Psychology: A Review of the Literature, 82 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 139, 139 (2004).
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especially maintaining the bonds between a mother and her young
150
The attachment relationships can be described as secure
child.
or insecure, and the quality of care an infant experiences can
151
impact the quality of the attachment relationship.
Ainsworth
described four subgroups of attachment relationships—secure,
152
avoidant, resistant, and disorganized.
Infants who experienced
abuse by a parent or caregiver who was emotionally unavailable
153
The abused
manifested a disorganized attachment relationship.
child seeks proximity to the adult who is the source of the abuse
and a figure of comfort and encounters an “irresolvable
154
paradox.”
The same paradox exists for the abused woman who
sees her abuser as the source of her distress but also as “everything
155
she ever wanted in a man.”
Dutton and Painter reviewed many studies to reach their
156
conclusions about traumatic bonding.
In analogizing the
previously mentioned studies to explain the emotional bonding of
battered women, “one feature that may weigh in favor of staying is
the intermittent nature of the abuse . . . many (battered women)
described highly pleasant periods of reconciliation between
episodes . . . . This pattern was conducive to ignoring the problem
or thinking of it as an aberrant, exceptional part of the
157
relationship.”
Dutton and Painter also discuss Walker’s cycle of
violence theory to bolster their findings that “[t]he emotional
aftermath of a battering incident for the batterer, usually guilt and
contrition, leads him to attempt to make amends via exceptionally
158
loving treatment toward his partner.”
Thus, “his improved
behavior serves to reduce the aversive arousal he himself created,
while also providing reinforcement for his partner to stay in the
159
relationship.”
The power imbalance and intermittent abuse elements of
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. David Shemmings, Research Relationships from an Attachment Perspective: The
Use of Behavioural Interview, Self-Report and Projective Measures, 18 J. SOC. WORK PRAC.
299, 301 (2004).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. WALKER, supra note 42, at 68.
156. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107.
157. Id. at 108 (quoting Bruce J. Rousaville, Theories in Marital Violence: Evidence
From a Study of Battered Women, 3 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT’L J. 11, 17 (1978)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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traumatic bonding explain why women do not leave abusive
relationships and may use unconventional strategies to protect
themselves or their children as they remain in the relationship.
The periods of reconciliation give the impression to an abused
woman that the partner will not continue to be abusive. The
dynamics are continually changing and the abused woman must
constantly assess her partner for her safety and the safety of her
children. Courts do not recognize the strategies battered mothers
160
employ as sufficient action in response to the violence inflicted.
Traumatic bonding cultivates a defense that can explain the
tension a battered mother faces in a violent relationship. She is
emotionally bonded to a violent partner and she must balance
those emotions against being a caretaker to her children and to
herself. Traumatic bonding explains the complexity of the choices
a battered mother makes including her strategies. Further,
traumatic bonding contextualizes the duress defense with the idea
that the battered mother lives in constant fear but she cannot easily
sever the bond she has with her abuser. The bond affects every
choice she makes.
B. Duress Defense
The affirmative defense of duress operates on a self-defense
construct. However, the defendant does not act to protect herself.
To the contrary, when the defendant commits a criminal offense,
the defendant must be operating under the threat of death or great
161
bodily harm by a co-defendant.
The threat leads to the criminal
act. The duress defense seeks to explain the circumstances of
acting with a co-defendant in committing a crime under a threat of
162
violence. There are five elements to the general principle of the
duress defense: (1) another person issued a specific threat to kill or
grievously injure the defendant or a third party, particularly a near
relative, unless he committed the offense; (2) the defendant
reasonably believed that the threat was genuine; (3) the threat was
present, imminent, and impending at the time of the criminal act;
(4) there was no reasonable escape from the threat except through
160. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
COURTS, CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, PARENTING IN
OF
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
15
(2003)
available
CONTEXT
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/fullReport.pdf.
161. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985).
162. DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 273.
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compliance with the demands of the coercer; and (5) the
163
defendant was not at fault in exposing himself to the threat.
The Model Penal Code (MPC) version of duress is broader:
(1) the defendant was compelled to commit the offense by the use,
or threatened use, of unlawful force by the coercer upon the
defendant; and (2) the defendant, a person of reasonable firmness
164
in her situation, would have been unable to resist the coercion.
The MPC duress defense abandons the common law requirement
that the defendant’s unlawful act be a response to an imminent
165
deadly threat.
Further, unlike the common law, the MPC does
allow the use of duress as an affirmative defense against a murder
166
charge.
A defense attorney can argue that the effect of traumatic
bonding leaves an abused woman so compliant and helpless that
her lack of action can be argued as the coercive effects of being in a
long-term abusive relationship. For example, Illinois statutes
163. Id. at 273-74; see also Burke, supra note 102, at 258 (finding that courts are
reluctant to apply battered woman syndrome to duress cases because the
syndrome describes subjective beliefs and is therefore irrelevant to whether the
objective test under the duress defense has been met).
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985); see also Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the
Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
1331, 1334 (1989) (arguing that the defense of duress lacks the moral authority to
excuse the actions of defendants unless the defendants have “attained or reflected
society’s legitimate expectations of moral strength”).
165. Dressler, supra note 164, at 1344.
166. Id. at 1374. Dressler discusses the moral quagmire that a jury would face
in case of a defendant asserting a duress defense to murder. Id. “A jury might
rightly expect people to manifest the utmost moral strength—even at some point
to choose death—when they have reason to know that they are playing a part even
a minor role, in an especially barbaric scenario . . . .” Id. Cf. People. v. Pollock,
780 N.E.2d 669 (Ill. 2002) (holding that evidence was insufficient to show that
defendant mother knew that her boyfriend was harming his daughter). In Pollock,
the Illinois Supreme Court overturned the conviction of the defendant for firstdegree murder and aggravated battery of a child. Id. at 689. The defendant’s
boyfriend was convicted of killing her two-year old daughter. Id. at 678. The
defendant was found guilty of felony murder and aggravated battery of a child. Id.
at 680. The trial court misstated the jury instruction by claiming the defendant
“knew or should have known” that her boyfriend was abusing her child, and thus,
imposed a negligent state of mind versus a knowing state of mind. Id. at 681. No
allegations of abuse existed, but the case highlights how mothers are held
accountable for the death of their children when their boyfriends commit the
murders. Id. at 684. Duress would assist these women when they suffer the
additional burden of an abusive relationship and losing their child. See People v.
Burton, 788 N.E.2d 220, 228 (Ill. 2003) (citing the Pollock decision in overturning
the conviction of a mother who failed to intervene when her boyfriend killed her
daughter).
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recognize that defendants can be compelled to commit crimes
167
against their will. The effect of being physically and emotionally
abused becomes so pervasive that the woman is not only unable to
defend herself; she also becomes an unwitting accomplice in the
168
death of her own child.
An abused woman can attempt to explain her inaction under
the duress defense, but courts are not necessarily sympathetic to
such a defense. In United States v. Webb, a battered woman charged
169
with failure to protect unsuccessfully pled a duress defense. June
Webb witnessed her husband kill their six-year old son, Steve, and
170
Keith Webb threatened to kill June
bury his body in the desert.
Webb, her remaining children, and her family in Wilmington if she
171
reported the crime.
June Webb later revealed the murder to
172
authorities.
The trial court instructed the jury that if it found that June

167. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7-11 (1961). Compulsion.
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense
punishable with death, by reason of conduct which he performs under
the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death
or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes death or great bodily harm
will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such conduct.
168. See State v. Lucero, 647 P.2d 406, 409 (N.M. 1982) (reinstating the child
abuse conviction of a mother who testified that she did not seek help for her son
or for herself for fear of further harm by her abusive boyfriend).
169. United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Heather
R. Skinazi, Comment, Not Just a “Conjured Afterthought”: Using Duress as a Defense for
Battered Women Who “Fail to Protect,” 85 CAL. L. REV. 993, 1007 (1997) (discussing
the implications of the Webb decision); Susan D. Appel, Note, Beyond Self Defense:
The Use of Battered Woman Syndrome in Duress Defenses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 955
(1994) (exploring the unwillingness of courts to recognize battered woman
syndrome as a duress defense).
170. Webb, 747 F.2d at 281.
171. Id. The jury found Webb guilty of failing to obtain medical care for Steve
Webb. Id.
The Government was required to prove five elements: (1) that the victim
was under the age of 14 years old, (2) that the defendant was the victim’s
parent, and thus had a duty to provide the victim with medical care, (3)
that the defendant engaged in conduct by omission that caused serious
bodily injury to the victim by failing to provide medical care for the
victim’s head injury (count 2) or scalding (count 3), (4) that the conduct
occurred within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States
(for purposes of the Assimilative Crimes Act), and (5) that the defendant
acted knowingly or intentionally. The trial essentially focused on whether
Webb’s conduct was the product of duress or whether she acted
knowingly or intentionally.
Id. at 282 n.4.
172. Id. at 281.
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Webb possessed no reasonable opportunity to escape the
173
The jury heard no
compulsion, it must find her not guilty.
evidence explaining why a battered woman would not be able to
174
leave.
Undoubtedly, the jurors could not understand why June
Webb was able to go to the authorities one month after Steve’s
death, but not when Keith Webb was abusing Steve. Without the
benefit of a psychological explanation of why June Webb could not
report the death of her son, the jury surmised that she was as
175
culpable as her husband.
The mere presence of the mother makes her culpable for the
176
Courts find knowledge equals guilt for
abuse of the child.
177
mothers.
Additionally, courts do not easily accept introduction
of the accused mother’s state of mind. For example, a mother
convicted of manslaughter and child neglect sought to introduce
her meek demeanor with regard to her relationship with the
178
boyfriend who killed her son.
The court rejected such evidence
finding it irrelevant and upheld the mother’s manslaughter
173. Id. at 285. The district court gave the jury the following duress
instruction:
Duress. Duress may provide a legal excuse for the crime charged in the
indictment. Duress is when a person commits an illegal act because she
was compelled to do so by the threat of imminent death or serious bodily
injury to herself or to another, such as one of her children. In order for
duress to provide a legal excuse for any criminal conduct, the
compulsion must be present and immediate, and of such a nature as to
induce a well-founded fear of impending death or serious bodily injury;
and there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape the compulsion
without committing the crime or participating in the commission of the
crime. Acts done under such coercion or compulsion are not done
willfully. If the evidence in the case leaves you with a reasonable doubt
that the Defendant, at the time and place of the offense alleged in the
indictment, acted or failed to act willfully and voluntarily, and not as a result
of coercion, compulsion or duress, as just explained, then it is your duty to
find the Defendant not guilty.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id. The court interpreted the Texas Penal Code to require that conduct
must be voluntary. When a defendant raises the defensive theory that the criminal
conduct involved was the product of duress or compulsion, the court interpreted
the Texas statute to require that the threats reach the level of compulsion. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05(e) (2003). “It is no defense that a person acted at the
command or persuasion of his spouse, unless he acted under compulsion that
would establish a defense under this section.” Id.
175. Webb, 747 F.2d at 281.
176. See State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982).
177. See infra Parts VII, VIII (discussing failure to protect laws and the strict
liability standard, respectively).
178. State v. Smith, 408 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/8

32

Brown: When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An Affirmative Defense
6BROWN_PAGINATED.DOC

11/17/2005 9:54:01 AM

2005] WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS

221

179

conviction.
Webb and other cases present a challenging question: “[W]hy
has domestic violence so rarely, and so unsuccessfully, been made
180
an explicit part of representing victims in these cases?”
Framing
the core issue of domestic violence with the challenge of mothers
who are charged with victimizing their children leaves courts in a
conundrum. “Punishing someone who commits a criminal act in
the throes of their own victimization offends our sense of justice,
particularly if the punishment arises out of a crime by the person
181
who is victimizing her.” However, courts convict the victimized.
Webb exemplifies the difficulty in using a duress defense alone
to countermand the legal duty a mother has to protect her
children—no matter what the circumstance the mothers face.
Courts have convicted mothers who suffer domestic violence as
182
equal or lesser parties in child abuse and child homicide cases.
V. DURESS DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Duress is a difficult defense to launch, especially when a
183
defendant seeks extralegal explanations for her culpability.
Courts exercise a strict normative interpretation of how duress can
184
be utilized to explain a defendant’s behavior.
Historically,
defendants have sought to use duress and coercion in a myriad of
approaches, including a World War II Japanese radio personality
who pled coercion to charges of being used as an instrument of
185
psychological warfare,
convicted kidnappers claiming threats
186
coerced their participation, and discharged police officers who
187
claimed they resigned under duress.
Present day courts do not give leeway to duress being used to
188
introduce battered woman syndrome.
The Eleventh Circuit
179. Id.
180. Evan Stark, A Failure to Protect: Unraveling “The Battered Mother’s Dilemma,”
27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 37 (2000).
181. Id. at 37-38.
182. See supra Part IV; see infra Part VI.
183. See Skinazi, supra note 169; see also Kelly Grace Monacella, Comment,
Supporting a Defense of Duress: The Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome, 70 TEMP.
L. REV. 699 (1997) (analyzing the use of battered women’s syndrome to support
the defense of duress).
184. Monacella, supra note 183, at 45-46.
185. D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951).
186. Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935).
187. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
188. See Monacella, supra note 183, at 714-20; see also United States v. Willis, 38
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Court of Appeals rejected the use of expert testimony to explain
189
battered woman syndrome. The defendant, Evelyn Ellis, used the
duress defense to explain that her husband induced fear, anxiety,
190
and fierce discomfort.
The lower court noted that Ms. Ellis was
191
Mr. Ellis murdered his first wife and
her husband’s “slave.”
brutalized Ms. Ellis. However, the circuit court rejected any threat
that was not immediate in nature that could not be used as
192
evidence to introduce battered woman syndrome.
The court’s
rationale was a “generalized fear of persecution from her
193
husband . . . does not allow her to escape the consequences . . . .”
The court also noted that Ms. Ellis had the opportunity to flee or
194
contact law enforcement about her husband.
The everyday reality of Ms. Ellis’s life, and what the courts
expect from battered women, portrays a gap in reality that few
courts have addressed. The Eleventh Circuit expected Ms. Ellis to
195
risk her life and the lives of her family to report her husband’s
criminal activity, a man who had killed his previous wife. Battered
women who have partners that engage in criminal activity have
little recourse but to be considered criminals themselves. However,
some courts have reviewed the use of battered woman syndrome as
196
a pliable defense.
Lisa Dunn explained to her jail chaplain that her boyfriend,
Daniel Remeta, threatened her with a gun, choked her, and
197
repeatedly threatened to kill her family. Daniel Remeta started a
198
The court
murderous crime spree that spread across Kansas.
convicted Lisa Dunn of aiding and abetting in murder, kidnapping,
F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding evidence of battered woman syndrome irrelevant
in duress claim because it only related to the defendant’s subjective weakened
mental state).
189. United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857, 860 (11th
Cir. 1991). The United States seized Ms. Ellis’ acreage after the court found her
guilty of drug trafficking. Id. at 859.
190. Id. at 860.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 861.
195. Hubert Ellis threatened Evelyn Ellis’ mother and had the mother sign
over the property that the U.S. government seized. Ms. Ellis’ daughters from a
previous relationship called Hubert Ellis the devil. Id. at 860.
196. Monacella, supra note 183, at 711-17 (offering analysis of cases that have
recognized the admissibility of battered woman syndrome evidence).
197. Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 310 (10th Cir. 1992).
198. Id.
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199

and aggravated battery.
The trial court refused to grant expert
200
funds for a psychiatrist. The appellate court granted Lisa Dunn’s
habeas petition not to raise a duress claim, but to negate the
201
element of specific intent based on Lisa Dunn’s state of mind.
Appellate courts have expressed sympathy to battered women who
the state charges as coconspirators, but the courts have granted
202
limited use of battered woman syndrome in duress cases.
Many
cases never reach the purview of appellate courts.
The Sixty Acres court addressed the crux of the problem courts
have with introducing battered woman syndrome into a duress
defense: a generalized fear does not substitute for an immediate
203
threat of death or great bodily harm.
Marrying a duress defense
with traumatic bonding would give the courts a greater
understanding of why women stay with violent and criminal
partners. Courts were initially reluctant to accept battered woman
syndrome to explain why the immediacy requirement in self204
defense cases had to be scrutinized in a different fashion. Courts
adopted a subjective viewpoint of the defendants and allowed
205
“imperfect” self-defense cases.
The same viewpoint is needed in
duress cases. If the trier of fact determines the subjective viewpoint
of defendants who claim duress incorrect, then the defendant
should be allowed an “imperfect duress” defense.
A perfect duress defense claims the defendant was compelled
to commit the crime under threat and was unable to resist the
206
coercion.
If objective and subjective requirements are met, the
defendant would be exonerated. In other words, if the threat
199. Id. at 309-10.
200. Id. at 310-11.
201. Id. at 313.
202. See Monacella, supra note 183, at 726; see also United States v. Brown, 891
F. Supp. 1501 (D. Kan. 1995) (granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial
based on new evidence of Ruby Brown being a battered woman at the time of the
offenses).
203. United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857, 860 (11th
Cir. 1991).
204. See supra Part II.
205. See supra Part II.
206. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985); see also BETH RICHIE, COMPELLED
TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK WOMEN (1996). Richie
explores gender entrapment to illuminate “the contradictions and complications
of the lives of African American battered women who commit crimes by
explaining the link between culturally constructed gender-identity development,
violence against woman in intimate relationships, and women’s participation in
illegal activities.” Id. at 4.
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under an objective analysis was such that the defendant had no
choice but to commit the crime, and subjectively, the defendant
could not resist the coercive effect of the threat, the elements are
satisfied. If the objective or subjective requirements are not met
(imperfect duress), then the defendant would be guilty of a lesser
offense.
Introducing the emotional bonds battered woman have to
their partners would assist courts in understanding that a
generalized fear has the same coercive effect of an immediate
threat. Traumatic paralysis seeks to create the nexus between a
generalized threat and a specific and immediate threat. Each type
of threat has the same coercive effect upon a battered woman.
VI. FAILURE TO PROTECT LAWS
A. Background
While courts have determined that the primary responsibility
of the child falls upon both parents, mothers are singled out as the
primary care takers, and take primary blame when tragedy strikes.
Blaming mothers began with the development of the child welfare
system and the creation of failure to protect laws in the Progressive
207
era.
White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) reformers’ fears of
depravity, poverty, and violence among urban and immigrant
208
The
communities led to intervention in individual families.
reformers did not address economic and environmental causes of
209
poverty. They sought state intervention. Courts fined and jailed
210
parents and removed children from their homes.
Mothers bore the brunt of the courts’ ire. The Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC) imposed middle class
211
standards on poor urban women. A mother who worked outside
212
of the home had her children removed.
The same woman
suffered physical abuse from her husband, but the court ignored
213
The attitude of courts towards battered mothers has
the claim.
207. Renee Goldsmith Kasinsky, Child Neglect and Unfit Mothers: Child Savers in
the Progressive Era and Today, 6 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 97, 99-105 (1994).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 100.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 103-04.
212. Id. at 104.
213. Id. Kasinsky details a 1922 neglect hearing where a mother was blamed
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not changed.
The majority of states have criminal child abuse legislation.
Thirty-eight states have statutes that include omissions of a duty to
214
protect in their lists of prohibited behaviors.
The remaining
twelve states have “commission statutes” that punish only willful
and intentional conduct of those persons who actually commit
215
abuse.
In every state, “parents have an affirmative legal duty to
216
protect and provide for their minors.” The state intercedes when
217
the parent fails in his or her duty.
State intervention does not take into account the history of the
battered woman. The state will investigate and determine whether
to remove the child but will not address the underlying abuse that
218
is pervasive in the family.
The battered mother is twice
victimized: by her abuser, and then by being labeled a bad mother
219
by the State.
Battered women are on the lowest rung of society and the legal
community. Women must exist in a society that imposes unrealistic
standards of motherhood but fails to protect women from the most
220
intimate arenas of violence.
The unjust legal standards applied
to failure to protect laws further erode the diminished status of
battered mothers. In the Nicholson cases, the State of New York
imposed unjust and unrealistic standards on battered mothers who
then became victimized twice: once by the batterer, and then by the
221
state.
Abused mothers and their children filed a class action suit
against the City of New York for removing the children because the
for leaving her ten and twelve year old sons alone in the home while she worked as
a domestic. Id. The court removed two of her six children. Id. The father was
not held accountable. Id. The mother raised domestic violence in the home, but
the court would only discuss the neglect allegations. Id.
214. Enos, supra note 24, at 236.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Appell, supra note 31, at 587-88.
219. See id. at 588. Appell argues that the state uses laws intended to protect
mothers and children from their abusers to remove children from their
nonabusive mothers. Id.
220. See Melner, supra note 24, at 304. Melner finds mothers’ rights are being
undermined by courts which may misevaluate the best interests of the children.
Id. This occurs when courts misperceive battered mothers to be unfit based
largely on myths and regard affirmative acts taken by the mother to protect her
children as passivity and thus a failure to protect. Id.
221. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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222

mothers suffered domestic violence.
The mothers argued that
the Administration of Child Services (ACS) violated their liberty
interest by removing their children without a hearing, an order, or
223
filed petition.
The New York court found ACS rarely held the
batterers accountable, did not offer adequate services to the
mother before removing their children, and separated battered
224
mothers and children unnecessarily.
The court granted the
225
mothers injunctive relief.
Nicholson portrays the dangers of inferred blame that battered
mothers shoulder while being victims. Child protection services in
New York created the legal standard of presumptive guilt. Legal
standards need to address the reality that battered mothers and
children face.
Child abuse is endemic. More than one million children are
226
abused and neglected every year. The National Child Abuse and
222. Id. On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the
New York Court of Appeals to harmonize the “best interests” test with the calculus
concerning “imminent risk” and “imminent danger” to “life or health.” Nicholson
v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir. 2003).
223. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 164-65. An ACS supervisor ordered a worker
to remove a new born baby from her mother after it was determined the father of
the child and the alleged abuser was paying the rent on the mother’s apartment.
Id. at 181. The baby was determined to be in “imminent danger,” because the
mother was economically dependent upon the father of the child. Id. ACS
coerced the mother into parenting and domestic violence classes before they
would return her baby. Id.
224. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 2004).
225. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 260. In subsequent appellate proceedings,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified three questions
to the New York Court of Appeals:
1) Does the definition of a neglected child include instances in which the
sole allegation of neglect is a person legally responsible for the child
allowing the child to witness domestic violence?; 2) Can injury result
from a child witnessing domestic violence against a caretaker rise to risk
or danger to the child’s life?; and 3) Does the child witnessing abuse
suffice to demonstrate “removal is necessary” or must the protective
agency offer more particularized evidence to justify removal?
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2003). The Court of
Appeals answered:
1) a party seeking to establish neglect must, by a preponderance of the
evidence, show physical or mental impairment, imminent danger, and
actual or threatened harm is a consequence of a parent/guardian’s
minimum degree of care; 2) exposing a child to domestic violence is not
presumptively neglectful; and 3) there can be no “blanket presumption”
favoring removal when a child witnesses domestic violence.
Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d at 844, 847, 854.
226. See ANDREA J. SEDAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL
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Neglect Data System (NCANDS) reported an estimated 1400 child
227
Physical abuse by fathers and other male
fatalities in 2002.
228
caretakers cause most child fatalities. However, society’s response
to the murder of a child is to punish the mother who lost her child.
Many states prosecute parents for the failure to protect a child
229
against abuse and neglect.
These omission statutes punish not
the abuser, but the parent or caretaker who failed to fulfill her or
his duty to protect the child. Nevertheless, the societal paradigm of
230
the bad mother is what empowers these laws.
Being a “good
mother” requires women to place themselves outside the domain of
231
self-concern.
Consequently, a woman who constructs a life independent
from that of her children or from the father or husband
does not conform to socially accepted notions of
mothering or of motherhood. Battered women, then,
who struggle for individual survival, as well as for the
survival of their children, are bad mothers and
transformed into cultural pariahs . . . . Mothers are
responsible for harms to children—harms that they had
no hand in creating. In many states, mothers are
responsible even when they are the targets of intra-familial
232
violence and not the perpetrators of such violence.
INCIDENT STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996), available at
http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/statsinfo/nis3.cfm.
227. See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFORMATION,
(2004), available at http://nccanch.act.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/fatality/cfm.
228. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/children.htm
#kidsrel.
229. Bryan Liang & Wendy McFarlane, Murder by Omission: Child Abuse and the
Passive Parent, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 409 n.100 (1999) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-604.01, 13-1105(a)(2), 13-3619, 13-3623 (West 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 273A (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-401 to 401.2 (1997); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 22-901 to -902 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. chs. 827.03-.071 (West 1997); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4.3, 115/53, 150/4 (West 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
265, § 13J (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 750.135, 750.136b (West 1997);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-3 (West 1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1997);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (West 1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.04 to
.041 (Vernon 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.1 to -248.17 (Michie 1997); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.16.100, 9A.42.010 to .030 (West 1997)).
230. Ahearn et al., supra note 9, at 858.
231. See Neal, supra note 8, at 64.
232. Miccio, supra note 17, at 93 (citing In re Melissa U., 148 A.D.2d 862 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989)); see also Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child:
The Error of Pursing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004)
(arguing it is wrong to charge battered mothers with abuse or neglect when their
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“In 2002, women experienced an estimated 494,570 rape,
sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault and simple assault
233
victimizations at the hands of an intimate.” “Intimate violence is
primarily a crime against women–in 1998, females were the victims
in 72% of intimate murders and the victims of about 85% of non234
lethal intimate violence.”
In the year 2000, intimates murdered
235
Women and children are equally vulnerable to
1247 women.
violence, yet the laws do not reflect such realities.
B. State v. Sarah Snodie
My son was being beat on and I was being beat on. I
almost came to Judge Malloy [of the Kenosha County
Family Court]. It was in November. I seen her outside
and I sat there while she was talking to people and I was
going to tell her what was going on, but I was afraid of
what she’d do. I was afraid of her taking my kids away and
locking me up for what happened, because Donnell
always said they would never believe you because they
never believed you before. So I tried to do it my own way
and I tried to wait him out until February 5th. He was
going to jail in Waukegan, so I thought I could outwait
him, but I couldn’t and I tried to leave with the kids that
Saturday night and he caught me. He bit me on my arm
and I was already bitten two other times and he sat there
and beat on me and he put me in a scalding hot shower. I
children witness domestic violence). Dunlap lists reasons why holding abused
mothers accountable for actions the state finds equally culpable as the abuser as
unfair:
1) a failure-to-protect charge presumes that the mother has not taken
concrete effective steps to protect her children; 2) although witnessing
domestic violence can harm children, not all are harmed to a degree that
warrants the coercive intervention of the child protection system; 3)
failure-to-protect charges may actually enhance the likelihood of harm in
several ways; 4) if women decline to seek help for fear of losing their
children, more battering may occur; 5) failure-to-protect charges
emotionally abuse the victim by replicating the coercive, authoritarian
behavior she experienced at the hands of the batterer; and 6) failure-toprotect charges, even if otherwise justifiable, are likely to be ineffectual.
Id. at 573-75.
233. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS , U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND VICTIMS
STATISTICS, CRIME CHARACTERISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
cvict_c.htm.
234. Id.
235. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTARY
HOMICIDE REPORTS (1976-2000).
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promised him I would not try to leave him ever again and
he promised to go to domestic violence counseling and go
to all this counseling and stuff, and I agreed to it but I was
planning on going to Social Services and asking if my
children could be sent up north, Waupaca, where they’d
be safe.
I guess I didn’t spell it out for anybody, but I asked all
the time for my children’s safety. I allowed Donnell to
beat on me. I told him to beat on me instead of my baby.
One time Drake scraped a fork against his teeth and I said
please don’t hit him, hit me instead. I taught [Donnell]
236
to be that way.
Sarah Snodie described, in chilling detail, the months of her
life leading up to the death of her son, Drake London. Sarah lived
in a constant state of fear and intimidation caused by her live-in
237
boyfriend, Donnell McKennie. She expressed the frustration she
238
faced in seeking help for her children as well as herself.
McKennie knew that if Sarah sought help, her credibility would be
questioned by the very apparatus that was meant to assist women in
239
crisis. Ironically, the District Attorney of Kenosha County, Robert
Jambois, expressed the same cynicism as Sarah Snodie about the
240
weaknesses existing in the system.
During Sarah Snodie’s
sentencing Jambois vociferously denied that Donnell McKennie
battered Sarah Snodie, stating:
Sarah Snodie has never told the truth, the full truth about
what happened to Drake London the final weeks of his
life. I don’t expect that she’ll tell the truth now. When
she talked to me, I don’t believe that she told the full
truth about what’s happened in this case. I don’t even
know if Sarah can even remember the full truth at this
236. Transcript of Sentencing at 84-85, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1997).
237. Id.; see also Dave Cole, Defense Lawyer Wants Gag Order on Abuse Case,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 28, 1997, at 3.
238. See generally Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at
Failure to Protect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 290-91 (2001) (discussing the various
difficulties, stereotypes, and obstacles battered women face in obtaining legal help
through the court system).
239. See generally id. (explaining that courts assume women can leave their
abusers and expect them to sacrifice their own safety for their children’s;
discussing one case where the court “snidely” dismissed the mother’s fear of her
husband, even though she knew he had murdered at least two other women).
240. See Transcript of Sentencing at 16-17, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1997).
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point because she told so many different statements as to
what occurred. She’s given so many different variations.
Donnell McKennie is the person who murdered Drake
London, but Sarah Snodie was right there with him every
step of the way and she was the child’s mother. Even if
there was some measure of truth to what is being said by
the people who were advancing domestic violence as a
defense in this case, even if there was some measure of
truth to that defense, some sliver of truth, don’t we expect
more than from the mothers of this community, from the
parents of this community? Wouldn’t we expect more on
behalf of Drake London than that which was provided to
him by his mother? Even a mother who’s being physically
abused by a boyfriend or a husband, wouldn’t we expect a
mother under those circumstances to do something more
than turn her head away when her infant son turns
pleading eyes toward her looking for some refuge from
241
the terrible violence that this child experienced?
Jambois articulated the legal standard to which all mothers
who fail to protect their children are held: the legally objective
reasonable self-sacrificing mother. Any mother who falls below the
242
bright-line test is prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
C. Legal Standards
Battered mothers are as much at risk for death or great bodily
harm as their children. However, courts do not address the
dilemmas mothers face on a daily basis in living with a violent
partner. The battered mother is placed in the legal juxtaposition
of choosing between the lesser of two evils: risking her life and the
lives of her children by remaining in a violent relationship or
having the state intervene and risk having her parental rights
243
terminated.
Failure to protect laws place the interest of the child against
that of the mother instead of seeking to find a solution that would

241. Id.
242. Fugate, supra note 238, at 290-91 (“Courts demand that women, in
contrast to men must sacrifice their safety, including standing up to the men who
beat them, in order to save their children and fulfill their ‘maternal instinct.’”).
Fugate finds mothers are expected to “be all-knowing when it comes to their
children and as a result face harsher scrutiny and are more likely to be blamed if
anything goes wrong.” Id. at 294.
243. See WALKER, supra note 54, at 34-35, 60.
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create a safe environment for the mother as well as the child.
The battered mother is placed in the dichotomous sphere where
her survival is opposed to that of her children. She must place
herself in harm’s way to protect her children and have no regard
for her safety and wellbeing. “Battered women then, who struggle
for individual survival, as well as for the survival of their children
245
are bad mothers and transformed into cultural pariahs.”
The
courts accept nothing less than complete sacrifice, and the legal
standards regard anything less as a prima facie case for termination
246
of parental rights.
The legal standards in failure to protect provisions construct
an essentialist view of motherhood that the mother must be selfsacrificing no matter how violent the partner, or what dangers she
may encounter. If she is not self-sacrificing, she must yield her
children to the child welfare system. Courts applying the objective
standard use domestic violence a mother suffers as a “sword to
247
sever the mother-child relationship.” The strict liability standard
248
measures maternal harm rather than maternal conduct.
The
courts measure the harm inflicted on the child by the abuser and
249
Each standard fails to take into
the mother as being equal.
account the stratagem battered mothers utilize as a subordinate in
a relationship epitomized by violence and domination.
A
subjective legal standard transcends legally imposed norms of
motherhood and allows the battered mother leeway to establish her
mens rea.
1.

Objective

The facially neutral failure to protect laws do have different
outcomes when applied to women who are unable to meet the
250
legally objective standard set in most courts. Battered women do

244. See Ahearn et al., supra note 9, at 855-56 (stating that child protection
agencies often remove children from situations of domestic violence without first
creating a safety plan for the mother and children or require mothers to seek
services “which may not be safe or available options in a particular case”).
245. Miccio, supra note 17, at 93.
246. Fugate, supra note 238, at 290-91.
247. Miccio, supra note 17, at 93.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Melner, supra note 24, at 316 (stating courts often fail “to give
adequate consideration to rational, affirmative responses battered women might
take to protect their children”).
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not think like the reasonable non-battered woman. The “New York
Family Court articulated an objective standard in finding a battered
mother abusive because she failed to stop the stepfather from
engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with her daughter,”
holding “that a reasonable, prudent parent would have both known
251
of the abuse and stopped such conduct.”
The mother is expected to become a supernatural parent who
overcomes the abuse she suffers, and she must also intervene to
save her child. The Katherine C. court recognized the abuse the
mother suffered, including being held at knifepoint by her
252
In spite of this, the court insisted that, because the
husband.
mother did not file for an order of protection, “such an omission
253
evinced an inability to protect.”
Additionally, “the court
insinuated that her failure to file for an order of protection vitiated
254
the existence of violence, its severity and its consequences.”
G.
Karen Miccio summarizes the tragedy of the judiciary attempting to
apply the objective standard to battered women:
The position taken by the court then underscores judicial
inability to adequately account for and assess the nature
and scope of domestic violence, particularly when
maternal conduct is compared with that of the reasonable
parent. The yardstick that measures maternal conduct is
inappropriate because the objective test filters out
violence. Within the context of child abuse such deformation
can
have
deadly
and
far-reaching
255
consequences.
2.

Strict Liability

As stated previously, all fifty states have parental duty-to-protect
256
statutes.
Most states, however, have “strict liability omissions
251. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 111 (citing In re Katherine C., 122 Misc. 2d
276 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984)).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.; see also In re A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding
battered mother liable using the objective test where there was no evidence of
direct abuse of the child); In re Michael M., 591 N.Y.S.2d 681, 685 (Fam. Ct. 1992)
(holding that children were neglected due to exposure to domestic violence
where their father abused their mother, and determining that the children were at
substantial risk of impairment, according to the expert testimony of a
psychologist).
255. Miccio, supra note 17, at 112.
256. Enos, supra note 24, at 237.
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statutes that require only a showing that the guardian held a duty
to care or protection and that the duty was violated through
257
inaction.”
Therefore, “the majority of omission statutes do not
require a showing of an affirmative act of neglect or malevolent
258
intent.” The de jure application of the failure to protect laws gives
259
no affirmative leeway for the battered woman to defend herself.
Karen Dalton had her parental rights terminated after her
husband prostituted her, physically and sexually assaulted her, and
260
persistently threatened to kill her.
Lawrence Dalton terrorized
261
his children with physical abuse as well. Karen Dalton attempted
to flee Lawrence only to be met with threats to abduct and kill their
262
children.
In upholding the order of termination, the Illinois
court determined Karen Dalton failed to protect her children no
263
Karen Dalton failed;
matter what efforts she had pursued.
therefore, she no longer had the right to be a mother.
The strict liability standard gives no leeway to examine the
tactics or strategies battered mothers use to survive their ordeal or
protect their children. Mothers who suffer domestic violence are
often considered unfit to parent, and courts have terminated their
264
parental rights.
A mother who successfully completed her
parenting classes still had her rights terminated because she
265
continued in abusive relationships. A mother who filed orders of
protection against her abuser had her parental rights terminated,
266
because she continued the relationship.
A new legal standard is
needed to address the needs of battered mothers when the state
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Melner, supra note 24, at 318 (“[C]ourts often recognize the [spousal]
abuse, yet fail to recognize its significance leading to the woman’s mental and
physical paralysis as well as her inability, despite her best efforts under the
circumstances, to provide a stable environment for her children or to protect
them from physical abuse.”).
260. In re Dalton, 424 N.E.2d 1226, 1228-29 (Ill. 1981).
261. Id. at 1229.
262. Id. at 1230.
263. Id. at 1232.
264. See In re Janine M.A., 796 N.E.2d 1175, 1182-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); see also
Leigh Goodmark, The Legal Response to Domestic Violence: Problems and Possibilities:
Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That For Sure? Questioning the Efficacy of Legal
Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 27 (2004)
(“[B]attered women are finding that when they become involved with the child
protection system, they are viewed as mothers who have failed their children by
being abused and are suffering the consequences.”).
265. In re C.W., 766 N.E.2d 1105 (Ill. 2002).
266. State ex rel. C.J.K., 774 So. 2d 107 (La. 2000).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

45

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 8
6BROWN_PAGINATED.DOC

234

11/17/2005 9:54:01 AM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

prosecutes them and terminates their parental rights.
3.

Subjective

The introduction of the subjective standard in failure to
protect prosecutions would allow the battered woman to address
267
her mens rea, or lack thereof, during the abuse. The affirmative
defense of traumatic paralysis sanctions the mother to explain her
268
Confronted by the legal construct of an
perceived inaction.
objective or strict liability standard, the battered woman faces an
insurmountable task.
The battered woman’s perception of
protecting her child against abuse will not withstand the legal
269
scrutiny of the rational reasonable mother.
A de facto application of failure to protect laws would recognize
the battered woman’s endeavor to save her child’s life. In State v.
McKennie, the criminal complaint describes Sarah Snodie’s
attempts to protect her son:
The defendant spanked Drake London very hard at least
twice, causing Drake to cry. The defendant continued to
hit him and hit him so many times that Sarah lost count.
She states she walked away because she was afraid to look
in Drake’s eyes as he was [sic] was asking for help. She
further stated that the defendant had hit her in the past
and that it hurt when the defendant hits her and that the
defendant hit Drake as hard as the defendant hit her in
the past. She further stated that she did see all of the
hitting since she walked away and went into the bedroom
while they were in the living room. She further states that
while in the bedroom she heard the defendant shoving
Drake’s head into the corner and that the defendant
always does that to Drake when he gets mad. She states
that the defendant came into the bedroom and they had
sex, but that after having sex, the defendant again went to
Drake, who was in the bathroom and brought him into
267. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 650 (explaining that a subjective standard of
reasonable behavior would allow a battered mother to argue she reasonably
believed “further intervention would create the risk of death or serious injury”).
268. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 119 (stating the “reasonable battered mother”
standard proposed by the author “permits inquiry into how environment
constructs maternal choices to control and minimize harm to herself and her
child”).
269. See id.; Melner, supra note 24, at 325 (arguing for a rationality standard
that would allow courts to take into consideration affirmative acts by the mother to
protect her child).
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the living room. She states that the defendant was mad
because Drake would not talk to him, and that the
defendant put a salt chili powder product into Drake’s
mouth, telling him it would make Drake talk. The
defendant gave Drake almost the entire package of
powder. Snodie states that her mother came over about
noon, but the defendant stayed in the bedroom with
Drake, and that she believes that Donnell was keeping
Drake in there so that her mother would not see the
marks on Drake’s butt. She further states that after her
mother left, the defendant was very mad because Drake
had punched Donnell in the nose and had spilled a cup
of water. She states that she and the defendant then had
sex again, because she figured it would keep Donnell
from beating on Drake, but while they were having sex the
defendant stopped and took Drake into the living room
out of her sight where she could hear Drake crying and
could hear Donnell pushing Drake’s head into the corner
again. She states after a few minutes the defendant came
270
back and they finished having sex.
A subjective legal standard is necessary to countermand the
inherent prejudice that a mother like Sarah Snodie faces in the
271
She attempted to use sex to placate a violent and
legal system.
highly sexual abusive partner, but her efforts were no longer
272
sufficient to protect Drake.
Donnell McKennie engaged in
sexual intercourse with Sarah while in the midst of causing the
273
death of Drake London.
An objective or strict liability standard
condemns Sarah Snodie.
A subjective standard seeks to
understand Sarah’s deportment, and her attempt to protect Drake
the only way she could, amidst such horror. Dr. Kevin Fullin, a
domestic violence expert, testified at Sarah Snodie’s sentencing.
Dr. Fullin described Sarah’s plight, “if you can imagine being
270. Criminal Complaint at 4, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1997).
271. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 107.
272. Carol Apt & David Farley Hulbert, The Sexuality of Women in Physically
Abusive Marriages: A Comparative Study, 8 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 57 (1993). The authors
compared female sexuality in abusive and non-abusive marriages. The abused
married women reported lower levels of intimacy and compatibility and greater
sexual dissatisfaction. However, they reported higher frequency of sexual
intercourse. The authors theorize that the abused wife must submit to the sexual
demands of her husband. Id. at 64-65.
273. Criminal Complaint at 4, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1997).
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raped, there is no good response to that level of control coercion
and violence . . . no matter what response you take it’s going to
274
result in more violence.”
D. Practical Application of Subjective Standard
The courts can use the subjective legal standard for failure to
protect cases to assist battered mothers who would have no defense
275
Battered mothers should
under standards such as strict liability.
be given the opportunity to rebut the presumptions of being a bad
276
The subjective standard should not be allowed for all
mother.
mothers charged in failure to protect cases. Battered mothers are a
distinct class that do not abuse their children but are held to
277
standards similar to abusers.
The subjective standard would allow the mother to offer an
affirmative defense to state allegations of abuse.
Statutory
construction would allow an evidentiary standard of either
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence
278
that the battered mother was indeed battered. Once the mother
has met the prima facie battered standard, the State would then
allow the mother to construct a subjective defense that seeks to
explain the State’s allegations of inactivity or failure to intercede by
the mother.
Battered mothers are held to a higher standard of scrutiny by
the State for being in abusive relationships and exposing their
279
children to violence.
These mothers need a legal standard that
addresses the presumptions inherent in the child welfare system
274. Transcript of Sentencing, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1997).
275. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 108, 110-11.
276. See State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court found that because the mother knowingly allowed her spouse to
repeatedly abuse her children physically and sexually, it fell within the statutory
construction of child abuse. Id. at 147. The court reasoned that although a
person was generally under no duty to protect another from hazardous situations,
the parent was under a duty to protect her children. Id. at 151. Wisconsin law
required professionals to report suspected child abuse and did not relieve parents
of their common-law duty to protect their children. Id. at 154-55.
277. See, e.g., In re Dalton, 424 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1981).
278. See Barbara Arco, Comment, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First
Amendment Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 604
(1998).
279. See Kasinsky, supra note 207, at 100-01, 120. Mothers throughout the
history of the court system were accused of being bad mothers because it is their
responsibility to raise orderly and healthy children. Id. at 98.
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that hold a battered mother accountable for her partner’s abuse.
VII.

TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS

A. Background
To raise the defense of duress, defense counsel must
countermand the societal presumption that the mother is the
principal caretaker and protector of her child. If defense counsel
fails to countermand this presumption, then the criminal justice
administration and child protection services will conclude that the
281
282
mother failed in her duty.
Such failure is a punishable crime.
The legal community expects mothers to be the barrier against
abuse to their children whether the abuse is known or unknown by
283
the mother.
When the abuse leads to the death of a child, a
284
severe legal assault is promulgated against the mother.
Traumatic paralysis is a polemical affirmative defense to
counter-criminal prosecution of battered mothers. Traumatic
paralysis should be utilized in the most extreme cases: mothers who
are charged as co-defendants in the murder of their children and
mothers charged with felony child neglect or failure to protect in
severe cases of child abuse and child homicide. Courts are least
sympathetic to these battered mothers.
Sarah Snodie represents one of the most severe cases. The
district attorney aggressively prosecuted the case and the court
found her culpable. Snodie’s defense counsel used battered
woman syndrome to explain her action and inaction throughout
her relationship with Donnell McKennie. The court rejected
defense counsel’s argument and sentenced Snodie to a ten-year
prison sentence.
Snodie was a battered woman. However, the district attorney
and the court still did not appreciate why she stayed with a man
who would eventually kill her child. Snodie sought to leave the
285
relationship, but McKennie used Snodie’s children to control her
280. See Enos, supra note 24, at 240-61 (addressing the false assumptions that
underpin courts’ application of the “failure to protect” doctrine to battered
woman).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 249.
283. Id.
284. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 587-88.
285. Transcript of Sentencing, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. Ct.
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286

behavior.
McKennie used violence and intimidation to control
Snodie and her children. Dutton and Painter detail how batterers
287
use physical abuse to maintain power in their relationships.
288
Relationships with children involved suffer a heightened danger.
Traumatic bonding does not displace battered woman syndrome
289
but seeks to give nuances to the psyche of battered women.
It
attempts to answer the question District Attorney Robert Jambois
asked of Sara Snodie: Why stay with a man who batters your child?

Jan. 21, 1997). Sarah Snodie testified during one battering incident she grabbed
her children and prepared to leave but she found herself in a tug-of-war over
Drake:
Q. What did Donnell do when he discovered the spot on the couch
where Donnell or where Drake, as you put it, peed?
A. He started yelling and stomping around the house. He yanked the
chair out from by the wall looking for whatever, and Drake got into. He
kept on saying that he [Drake] didn’t know how to leave things alone.
Q. Did he touch Drake after discovering that spot on the couch?
A. He picked him up and brought him to the bathroom.
Q. And what did he do then?
A. He was yelling at him saying this is where you use the bathroom.
Q. And then what happened?
A. He brought him back. He set him down, and I picked him up and
told him I
was leaving with Felicia, and I grabbed Felicia.
Q. What happened next?
A. He grabbed Drake from me.
Q. And what did he do when he grabbed Drake from you?
A. He took Drake and put him over by the chair, and he told me to put
Felicia down and get a rag and clean up the mess.
Q. Did he put him by the gold chair or did he throw him by the gold
chair?
A. He set him down really hard by the gold chair.
Q. What happened next then?
A. I looked at Drake and I told Donnell I was only playing, that I wasn’t
leaving the house and he told me to get a rag and wipe up the mess
Drake made.
Drake later had a seizure after being hit in the head numerous times by
McKennie. Id.
286. See Belknap, supra note 126, at 392. Belknap noted that women
experienced a conflict between “feeling love and feeling sorry for the abuser and
the realization that life with him was harmful to the self, others or both.” Id.
287. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107.
288. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTARY
HOMICIDE REPORTS (1976-2000).
289. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 105. No one theory can be
dispositive as to why battered women risk their lives and the lives of their children
by staying in abusive relationships. See, e.g., Belknap, supra note 126, at 388. An
amalgam of theories is best suited to answer such a provocative question. Id. at
401-03.
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The key element to launching a traumatic paralysis defense is
the emotional bond the battered woman has with her abuser that
290
leaves her incapable of protecting herself or her children.
The
strategies that a battered mother utilizes for the protection of
herself and her children cannot match the violence perpetrated by
the abusive partner/father. Battered women do not lack agency,
but are limited by their circumstances to fully undertake the means
291
The McKennie criminal
necessary to operate as society expects.
complaint detailed how Snodie used her sexuality to distract
292
McKennie from further harming Drake but to no avail.
He
would interrupt sexual intercourse to abuse Drake. The attempt to
distract McKennie was not accepted by the court or the district
attorney. Snodie’s strategies of placating McKennie did not save
her child’s life. The State prosecutes mothers who seek to protect
293
their children in unconventional or unacceptable ways.
The duress defense generally counters crimes of commission.
Traumatic paralysis can be used to counter the crimes of omission
against mothers who are not able to protect their children.
Battered women operate under the constant threat of death or
294
bodily harm. The woman has obviously been abused in the past;
295
thus, she takes the threats from her batterer quite seriously. The
296
Snodie’s testimony
threats are always imminent in nature.
297
Her child suffered
portrayed a woman living in constant fear.
abuse that was immediate and brutal in nature. Battered women
298
also believe that they have no reasonable escape from the abuse.
Studies note the most dangerous phase of a battering relationship

290. See Appel, supra note 169, at 979.
291. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 602-03 (stating that the law views battered
women as able to save their children, not realizing the complexity of the
victim/agent dichotomy); see also Elaine Chiu, Confronting Agency in Battered
Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223 (2001) (focusing on how the laws regard the
choices by battered women differently).
292. See Criminal Complaint at 4, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 21, 1997).
293. See supra Part VI.A. (describing the details of the Nicholson case where
mothers did not leave abusive relationships and the court holding the mothers
criminally liable).
294. See WALKER, supra note 42, at 75.
295. Id.
296. See Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 106.
297. See Transcript of Sentencing, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 21, 1997).
298. See Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 109-10.
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299

is when the battered woman attempts to leave.
The court does
hold the battered mother culpable for exposing her children to
violence, but does not recognize her strategies while in the
300
relationship.
B. Practical Application
Traumatic paralysis can be used to bolster expert testimony as
to the motives and understanding of the battered mother. The
process of explaining learned helplessness and traumatic bonding
will give the trier of fact a greater understanding of why a mother
would risk harm to herself or her child by staying in a potentially
301
Traumatic paralysis can overcome the
deadly relationship.
302
It explains
societal hubris that demands self-sacrificing mothers.
the complexity of the trauma battered mothers face and the
303
choices they must make on a daily basis for survival needs.
A jury instruction detailing traumatic bonding would allow
judges and juries to step into the mind of women like Sarah
304
Snodie.
When a battered mother uses duress as a defense, an
instruction should be allowed to mitigate her intent or reckless
behavior of the battered mother. The instruction would merge
duress and the crime of omission with elements of traumatic
paralysis:
(1) the defendant was compelled not to act by the use, or
threatened use, of unlawful force by the coercer upon the
defendant;
(2) the defendant, a person suffering from traumatic
bonding in her situation, would have been unable to resist
the coercion;
(3) the defendant, operating as a reasonable person in
her situation, was unable to protect herself or others
because of the unlawful force.
299. See Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence
Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX J. WOMEN & L.
163, 187 (1993).
300. See infra Part VII. (highlighting the policy of punishing battered mothers
who stay in abusive relationships; courts either criminally charge the mothers or
terminate their parental rights).
301. See Cohen, supra note 71, at 763-64.
302. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 655-56.
303. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 93.
304. See, e.g., CAL. CRIM. JURY INST. 5.17 (2005) (giving instructions with regard
to an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief with regard to justifiable homicide).
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The instruction seeks to outline how acts of omission are
criminal but explainable because of traumatic paralysis. The
instruction is not seeking outright exoneration of battered
mothers, but rather seeks a greater explanation as to why such
tragic circumstances exist.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

If it keeps on rainin’, levee’s goin’ to break
And the water gonna come in, have no place to stay
Well all last night I sat on the levee and moan
Thinkin’ ‘bout my baby and my happy home
If it keeps on rainin’, levee’s goin’ to break
And all these people have no place to stay
Now look here mama what am I to do
305
I ain’t got nobody to tell my troubles to
The paradigm of punishing battered mothers for the death of
their own children places abused families in competing positions
for protection and safety. If the mother is the last line of
protection for abused children, who protects the mother? The
tactics a battered mother uses to protect her child, she must also
use to protect herself. When the levee breaks, when the battered
mother’s strategies no longer placates the batterer, the mothers
risks criminal prosecution and termination of her parental rights
for not sufficiently protecting her child.
Sarah Snodie used tactics that did not save her child’s life.
Sarah Snodie typifies the dilemma many battered mothers face.
The emotional bonds that keep battered mothers in abusive
relationships coalesce with the maternal bonds that protect their
children from the violence. Traumatic bonding can answer the
perpetual question of why many battered mothers stay in abusive
relationships. The power imbalance of violent relationships creates
an abused woman who is incapable of making life-altering or lifethreatening decisions without considering the consequences from
her violent partner. The decision to stay in a violent relationship
eventually makes the battered mother a target for prosecution and
parental rights termination.
305.

KANSAS JOE MCCOY, WHEN THE LEVEE BREAKS (1929).
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Traumatic paralysis is not a defense for every abused woman.
A prima facie requirement would provide courts guidance as to
what constitutes a battered mother. The defense was designed for
women who did not participate in the child abuse but are charged
as co-actors. To assert a claim of traumatic paralysis three
components should be present: (1) a history of abuse in the
relationship, (2) the woman who is emotionally bound to her
abusive partner, and (3) the emotional bonding must render the
abused woman unable to protect herself or others because of the
persistent abuse. The abused woman may assert some actions or
strategies she participated in to protect herself and her children
that were unsuccessful.
Society must make it easier for battered women to leave violent
relationships. If a battered mother seeks assistance, she knows she
risks the child welfare system removing her children. The children
are rescued, but the battered mother must return to a violent
household. The battered mother bides her time waiting to execute
an egress that may never come—risking her life, the lives of her
children, her liberty, and her parental rights. Traumatic paralysis
can be used to defend battered mothers’ tough choices.
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